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ABSTRACT

GENERALIZATION OF THE EFFECTS OF REWARDS ON HIGH BASE-RATE BEHAVIORS
June

1978

Harold John Honebrink, B.A., St. Johns University
Ed. D.

,

University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Peter Wagschal

Writers on education have remarked that the process of education seems to have the unintended effect of causing

curiosity.

Research has demonstrated that rewarding

rate behavior can subsequently have
Since learning is construed as

a

a

decline in

a

high base-

a

negative effect on that behavior.

high base-rate or intrinsically

motivated behavior, it is possible that

a

decline in learning might

be caused by the undermining effect of rewards on learning.

The

research documented here does not deal directly with the relationship between rewards and learning problems.

This research attempts

to broaden the findings of other researchers on the effect of

rewards on high base-rate behavior while at the same time avoiding
some of the methodological weaknesses of their studies.

The concept of intrinsic motivation, upon which many of these

writers base their research, is examined in Chapter One.

The

development of the intrinsic-extrinsic concept from its original
supposed role as

a

determiner of behavior to

a

more refined

approach which treats relative intrinsicity or extrinsicity as

perceptions having differential effects on the emission of behavior
is described.

along

a

The concept that perceived locus of causality,

continuum from external to internal, affects

persistence

is

introduced in Chapter One.

a

behavior's

Chapter Two reviews

behavior.
research addressing the negative effects of rewards on

2

Chapter Three describes

a

methodology for testing whether or not

the rewarding of some behaviors can have

a

negative effect on

the duration of other behaviors.
Two experiments which were performed for this paper are

reported on and discussed in Chapter Four.

The experiments

support predictions of generalization of undermining effects to
behaviors other than target behaviors.

In Experiment One,

forty

nursery school students were divided into experimental and control
conditions.

In the experimental

conditions they were rewarded

for engaging in multiple high base-rate behaviors.

control conditions subjects were not rewarded.

In the

Duration of

a

criterion activity which differed from the rewarded activities
was measured.

Experiment Two was considered

a

replication of

Experiment One, but with one of the rewarded activities chosen
for its greater similarity to the criterion activity.
In Chapter Five,

bahavior modification literature findings

on generalization and maintenance of educational and treatment

effects are reviewed for evidence contradicting the findings of

research describing undermining effects.

Methodological problems

with behavior modification research, as well as its focus on
low base-rate behaviors, prevent direct application of findings
to the undermining literature.

Chapter Five analyzes implications

of the present research for token economies and for school learning

situations.

Means for avoiding negative effects of reward

procedures are reviewed.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Contingent rewards have traditionally been assumed to affect
behavior positively.

Provision of reward

is

said to reinforce or

strengthen the behavior in question, i.e., increase the behavior's
frequency, quality, duration, etc.

Reinforcement effects have

been documented extensively; many psychologists and educators

accept the use of reinforcement procedures uncritically.

Little

experimental attention has been devoted to possible negative

consequences or side effects of reward procedures.
Whether the goal

is to

decrease undesirable behavior or to
an issue of prime import to an agent

teach an individual

to read,

seeking to effect

behavioral change is the resistance of that

a

behavior to extinction, i.e., its behavioral maintenance capability.
For example, we are concerned not only that an individual
to read in school,

but also that the individual continues to read

after his schooling.
individual

learns

Likewise, we are not only concerned that an

who received therapy for destructive behavior cease

the objectionable behavior while in therapy, but also that the

behavior does not reappear.

Effects of rewards on behavior

.

Until

recently (Deci, 1971)

rewards on behavior
very little research involving the effects of

rewards on the behavior
had considered the deferred effects of the
3

4

in question,

nor had it considered the effects of rewards on

other behavior.

Analyzing the effects of rewards involves abstract-

ing certain events (rewards, behaviors) and principles (contin-

gencies, functions) from the stream of behavior (see Bandura,
1969,

While this abstraction may serve an heuristic

1975).

function, other variables remain operative within the stream of

behavior, variables which do not become inoperative because we have

not abstracted them, variables of which it would be useful to be
cognizant.

Assume that one rewards an individual for

a

behavior

he would perform "for its own sake" or without provision of reward,

and that the individual comes to feel
is attempting

to control

that the provider of reward

his behavior through provision of reward.

The individual may show an increase in that targeted or abstracted

behavior either while still in the controlling situation, or later,
if certain features of the controlling situation remain salient to

him.

But when those features of the controlling situation do not

serve to redintegrate the situation for him, he may no longer
perform the target behavior as often or as well as he did under

conditions of reward, or as much as he did before reward.
If we are in a position where we have measured an increase in

the target behavior while the individual

is

still

expecting reward,

we
we would conclude that by rewarding the behavior in question
had increased its duration, frequency or quality.

However, the

only
individual may have responded to our experimental reward not

with an instrumental

increase in the behavior while the cues were

operative, but also with

a

cognition to the effect that we were

/

5

attempting to control his behavior.

Specifically he might have

concluded that the behavior we were attempting to foster could
not have been worth doing for its own sake or we would not have
had to reward him to do it (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett, 1973).

The individual may react against our attempts at control in
an attempt to restore his perceived loss of freedom (Brehm, 1966).
He may not perform the behavior in the future as long, as well,
or at all as

a

result of his cognition that it must not be worth

If we were to measure the targeted behavior at some time

doing.

in the future, would we conclude that our reward procedure had

caused the activity to decrease in duration, frequency, and/or
qual ity?

Finally, what would be the deferred effect if we were to

reward

a

whole class of behavior (for example, learning behavior)

such that the individual

perceived that we were attempting to

control all learning behavior, or that all learning behavior was

not worth doing for its own sake?

would generalize.

The negative effect of reward

When our reward procedures had ceased operating,

we would expect that other, unrewarded learning behaviors would

decrease in duration.

We would have succeeded in producing an

iatrogenic learning disorder.
A student of behavior would profit from awareness of effects

of reward on behavior other than those readily observable in the

rewarding situation.

He would profit as well

from an awareness

inconspicof any particular conditions under which those deferred,
occur.
uous, or not immediately discernible effects

We must

6

examine the effects of our procedures on our longterm goals as
well as the concomitant or attendant effects (Levine & Fasnacht,

1975, 1976; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Winett & Winkler, 1972).

The particular question this dissertation will probe is this:

what is the deferred effect of tangibly rewarding high base-rate
behaviors on the duration of

Implications of research

a

similar behavior?

The deferred effects mentioned above

.

are relevant to the behavior modification literature as well
as to typical

grades.

classroom reward procedures such as gold stars or

Token economies,

a

widely used in classrooms.

behavior modification procedure, are
Reward systems are introduced upon

entrance to school programs or token programs with very little

documentary evidence as to the long-term effects of the procedures
or the efficacy of the system in these situations (Stuart, 1972).

Holt (1964) and Silberman (1970) recognize

curiosity which they see as
have

a

a

a

result of schooling.

decline in
If rewards

deleterious effect on high base-rate behavior, and if

learning, as

a

high base-rate behavior (Jung, 1968) is rewarded,

we would expect that rewards will have

a

deleterious effect on

learning.

O'Leary and Drabman (1971) and Levine and Fasnacht (1975)
call

for data on generalization following removal of token programs.

Because of research documenting the potentially counter-productive
effects of rewarding high base-rate behaviors, closer scrutiny
should be paid to the efficacy of the programs.

If a great

7

potential

for harm exists, with little potential for gain,
serious

question should be given the wisdom of maintaining these
programs
in their present form.

Conversely, if no potential for harm exists,

any gain through the use of reward procedures would make the

programs and procedures worthwhile.
In either case,

an examination of methods is necessary to

avoid problems related to undermining effects.

Skinner (1971)

acknowledges the possibility of harm when he states, "Genuine
reinforcers can be used in ways which have aversive consequences"
(p.

34)

and "conditioned positive reinforcers can often be used

with deferred aversive results" (p. 33).

Levine and Fasnacht (1975) fault the behavior modification

literature for not containing qualifications as to its utility,
viz., that it has potential

for harm.

In an earlier article,

Levine and Fasnacht (1974) note that attention must be paid to the
process of removing reinforcers, and that "removal of reinforcers

constitutes an extinction paradigm, not
(p.

a

generalization paradigm"

819).

Feingold and Mahoney (1976) identify

problems with shotgun

approaches to behavior modification:
One very relevant concern in the wholesale adoption of
token economy procedures in schools has to do with their
effects on children's academic interests. When structured reward conteingencies are applied to an entire
classroom, it is unlikely that every single child in the
class was exhibiting pre-program deficiencies inacademic
This raises the possibility that
or social performance.
some children will begin receiving extrinsic rewards for
behaviors which they had previously engaged in without
supplementary incentives,
(pp. 367-368) (c.f. Winett &
Winkler, 1972)

8

Since research documenting

decrement in high base-rate

behavior following reward exists, the potential for harm
exists.
Feingold and Mahoney (1976) question the goals of token programs,

Given the occasional adoption of restrictive, discipline relevant
goals (Winett and Winkler, 1972) and the concomitant de-emphasis
of personal, social and educational factors (Silberman, 1970), it

seems unlikely that all classroom token procedures are free of

negative effects" (p. 376).
Rewards have been shown to negatively affect high base-rate

behaviors, behaviors many writers characterize as intrinsically

motivated.

A discussion of the concept of intrinsic motivation

follows.

Intrinsic Motivation

.

A major point of this paper revolves around

evidence that the particular motivator, stimulus to action, or
inducement for an activity differentially affects subsequent

performance of that activity and similar activities.

classifying stimuli to action or motivation

is

One way of

whether the partic-

ular causes are intrinsic or extrinsic in nature.

Investigators

of varying backgrounds, studying motivation for activity or
causal

factors relating to activity, have sometimes drawn

distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic factors.

a

Lepper and

Greene (1976) state:
Among experimental social psychologists the distinction
between internally and externally governed behavior has
long been regarded as fundamental. Whether cast in terms
of 'internalization' vs. 'compliance' (Kelman, (1958),
'private' vs. 'public' behavior (Asch, 1948; Collins,
1973), 'intrinsic' vs. 'extrinsic' motivation (deCharms,

9

1968), or 'internal' vs. 'external' control (Bern, 1972),
conceptual line has been drawn between behavior
which appears to be a function of clear and powerful
environmental contingencies and behavior which occurs
in the seeming absence of salient external contingencies"
(p. 25).
a

Ross (1975) describes behavior as intrinsically motivated if
a

person "performs an activity 'for its own sake' and extrinsically

motivated if the activity
is,

is

performed as

to obtain a reward or avoid

and Staw (1975b,

p.

a

a

means to an end, that

punishment" (p. 245).

Calder

599) quote Young (1961):

If a situation contains a specific goal which provides
satisfaction independent of the actual activity itself,
behavior is said to be extrinsically motivated. On the
other hand, if the activity is valued for its own sake,
and appears to be self-sustained, behavior is said to be
intrinsically motivated,
(p. 171).

Staw (1976) explains that "whereas extrinsic motivation emphasizes
the value an individual

places on the ends of an action and the

probability of reaching those ends, intrinsic motivation refers to
the pleasure or value associated with the activity itself" (p. 2).

Berlyne (1971) asserts that intrinsically motivated behaviors are
those behaviors aimed at establishing certain internal conditions
that are rewarding for the organism;

a

person will behave so as to

maintain an optimal level of stimulation.

Deci

(1975) defines

intrinsically motivated behaviors as,
behaviors which a person engages in to feel competent
behaviors
and self-determining. .Intrinsically motivated
stimulano
is
there
When
will be of two general kinds.
stimulation
no
gets
who
person
tion people will seek it. A
he seeks
.so
will not feel competent and self-determining.
-determining
self
and
out... ways in which to feel competent
motivated
...The other general kind of intrinsically
reducing
behavior involves conquering challenges or
to reduce incongruity
incongruity. Only when a person is oble
.

.

10

(or reduce dissonance) .. wi 1 1 he feel competent and
self-determining. .He will feel satisfied when he is
able to seek out pleasureable stimulation and deal
.

.

effectively with over-stimulation. .seeking and
conquering challenges which are optimal for him.
.

(pp.

61-62)

Earlier, Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b) distinguished between

extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on the basis of whether the
individual located the causality for an activity within himself
or whether he located it in the external evironment.

Kruglanski

(1975b) points out some conceptual difficulties:

Any activity seems to have an internal cause, the
actor's motive for engaging in it, and b) many
activities seem to have both an external cause and
an internal one, namely the anticipated change in the
environment (reception of the reward, solution of the
problem) satisfying the actor's motive for engaging
in the activity,
(p. 744)

Kruglanski attempts to avoid such problems by basing the distinction

between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on whether the person's

self-attributed cause for an activity lies in its content or its
consequence.

He states that this distinction is on a strictly

attributional level, irrespective of the actual motives satisfiable

within the content or consequence of the activity.
Staw (1976), in an attempt to amend expectancy by value
working
theories of motivation to include intrinsic factors, lists
involved and also for
on a task for the activity and stimulation
of accomsatisfaction at accomplishment; the former regardless

regardless of
plishment or tangible rewards and the latter
external rewards.

performance:

1)

He lists three sources of value for task

value associated with

a

behavior itself, 2) value

11

associated with accomplishment, and
presented by others.

3)

value associated with rewards

Staw claims the first two sources of value

are intrinsic, since they are mediated by the individual, and that
the third is extrinsic.

However, if we were to apply another

definition of intrinsic motivation to the three sources of value,
namely Ross' 1975 distinction based on whether the activity is

performed for its own sake or as

means to an end, we see that

a

performing an activity for the sense of accomplishment is performing
the activity as

a

means to an end, i.e., accomplishment.

Thus,

depending on the definition, values one and two are intrinsic
and three extrinsic, or, values two and three are extrinsic and one
is

the intrinsic value.

Operational definition of intrinsic motivation
(1975)

.

Reiss and Sushinsky

identify problems with the operational definition

of

intrinsic motivation employed by Lepper and his associates:

Under the operational definition of intrinsic motivation
studies percentage of
employed in the Lepper et al
time a subject chose to engage in an activity-all
behaviors are intrinsical ly motivated. .. intrinsic motivation is defined as a property of a situation rather than
as a property of behavior, thus drawing will appear
intrinsically motivating under one set of alternatives,
(See also Reiss and Sushinsky,
but not under others.

—

.

1976).

(p.

1124)

motivation
Reiss and Sushinsky attack the concept of intrinsic
for its vagueness.

operational
The concept of intrinsic motivation demands
concept is
this
The vagueness inherent in
definition.
(1973; Note 1)
clearly evident in the Lepper et al
to draw
studies in which control students were asked
their
viewing
because an experimenter was interested in
elicited
The investigators considered drawing
drawing.
even when accompanied by coaxing,
in this request,
.

_
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drawing under conditions of 'intrinsic' motivation,
that is, under conditions which do not cause re-attribution of drawing to external factors... it could be
maintained that the promised reward procedures elicited
intrinsic motivation (mastery--the attainment of which
was symbolized by the reward), the control procedures
elicited extrinsic motivation (compliance). Thus the
concept of intrinsic motivation is so vague that its
presence or absence can be inferred arbitrarily, depending on the investigator's theoretical bias.
(p. 1124)

Intrinsic motivation as

a

case of secondary reinforcement

.

Cofer

and Appley (1967) criticize the account of behavior in terms of

intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
is

They state that the process

merely described and not explained and that other theories

might plausibly explain the phenomenon, notably secondary reinforcement.

Secondary reinforcement refers to

a

process by which an

originally neutral stimulus acquires reinforcing properties through
its association with a primary reinforcer.

In these terms,

an

intrinsically motivated activity is simply one in which the rein-

forcement value of the goal has associatively rubbed off on the

behavior itself (Calder and Staw, 1975).

Problems arise in turn

with an explanation of the phenomenon in terms of secondary

reinforcement.
A secondary reinforcement criticism implies concomitant

de-emphasis of cognitive factors.
learning as

a

Jung (1968) portrays verbal

combination of associative and cognitive aspects.

Bandura (1974) states that:
withBehavior is not much affected by its consequences
1969,
(Bandura,
reinforced
out awareness of what is being
instruthe
discern
After individuals
Dunlay, 1968).
contingent
mental relationship between action and outcome,
behavior
oppositional
rewards may produce accomodating or
influences,
the
depending on how they value the incentives,
(p. 860)
the behavior itself, and how others respond,

13

Bandura sees reinforcement as changing "from

a

mechanical strength-

ening of conduct to an informative and motivating influence."

Feingold and Mahoney (1975) state, "The pervasive influence of

cognitive processes in human performance can hardly be overlooked"
(p.

368),

(see also Mahoney, 1974) and "the potential

importance

of attribution in personal motivation merits further examination"
(p.

368).

White (1959) portrays interaction with the environment as an

independent human motive,

a

motive observed so strongly and so early

that it precludes description in reinforcement terms.

White

recounts at length Piaget's 1952 description of his son Laurent's

interaction with

rattle, observing that the child uses nearly

a

the whole repertoire of psychological

processes (except those

accompanying stress) i.e., sensing perceiving, attending, learning,
,

recognizing, recalling, thinking and pleasant affect.
that this behavior is selective, directed,

He states

persistent, in short,

motivated toward power, control, or primitive self-assertion.
White suggests that an overview of the situation

is

necessary to

understand the key to what transpires, an overview yielding

a

picture of an individual discovering the effects he can have on
him.
his environment and the effects the environment has on

also Bandura, 1975, p. 124).

(See

He calls this motivational aspect

the experiof competence "effectance" (p. 321) and characterizes

ence produced as

a

feeling of efficacy (p. 326).

White discusses

primary and secondary
his concept of effectance in relation to

reinforcement and concludes that effectance

is an

independent

14

motive (See also DeCharms, 1968).

Perception of causality

Issues of whether one's behavior is

.

actually intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated are avoided in
preference to the question of whether the individual sees his

behavior as intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated.
intrinsicity

is

seen as

a

Relative

perception on the part of the individual:

Does one attribute his behavior to intrinsic or extrinsic causes?

Does one perceive the locus of causality for his behavior as
internal or external?

Implications for these questions will be

discussed later in the paper.
Bern

(1968, 1972) and DeCharms (1968) represent behavioristic

and humanistic perspectives, respectively, on the individual's

acquisition of knowledge about his own behavior, viz., attribution
of causality for his behavior.

DeCharms is cited in the work of

Calder and Staw (1975) and Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1975),
while

Bern

is

cited in the work of Lepper and his associates, e.g.,

Lepper and Greene, 1973;

Greene and Lepper, 1974; Lepper and

Greene, 1975; Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper, 1976.
as a reader of Deci's 1971 study.

effects of rewards on behavior.
Bern's and DeCharms'

Bern

is

credited

These writers study the negative
For purposes of this research,

positions are seen to differ primarily on

the origins of the perception of causality.
Bern's

asserts that indivi(1967, 1972) self perception theory

internal states by observduals acquire knowledge about their own

circumstances in which it occurs.
ing their own behavior and the

15

DeCharms position begins with self-knowledge and asserts that

people make interpersonal attributions partly on the basis of

what they know about themselves,
Bern

(c.f. Deci, 1975)

(1965) sees origins of knowledge about ourselves as

based on perceptions of our own and others behavior:
An individual's belief and attitude statements and the
beliefs and attitudes that an outside observer would
attribute to him are 'inferences' from the same evidence;
the public events that the socializing community originally
employed in training the individual to make such selfdescriptive statements,
(p. 200)

'

Bern

(1972) states:

"a

person will

infer that he was intrin-

sically motivated to execute the induced behavior to the extent

that external contingencies of reinforcement appeared to be
absent" (p. 39).

We see

Bern

viewing intrinsic motivation as

a

perception on the part of the individual, one he has inferred
from cues in the situation, cues which are external to him.

DeCharms (1968) states that, "What

demonstrate the fact that

a

Bern

has done... is to

person may be influenced in his infer-

ences about himself and others by observing his own or their

behavior" (p. 175).
to Bern's research

DeCharms makes this statement in reference

indicating that an external event

(a

colored

light) previously associated with telling the truth, can sub-

sequently influence
is

a

subject to justify his own statement that

discrepant from his original belief by changing his belief

toward

the discrepant statement.

indiviDeCharms (1968) places emphasis of the origins of an

individual's internal
dual's knowledge about his behavior onto the

:
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states:
In stressing the concept of personal causation, we are
not denying that we learn from our own and others
behavior, although we are giving priority to the
personal and ultimately private aspects of knowledge
about our feelings and motives,
(p. 36)

DeCharms forcuses on where the person perceives the locus of

causality for his behavior:

'

Whenever a person experiences himself to be the locus
of causality for his own behavior (to be an Origin)
he will consider himself to he intrinsically motivated.
Comversely, when a person perceives the locus of
causality for his behavior to be external to himself
(that he is a Pawn) he will consider himself to be
extrinsically motivated. We are suggesting that the
crux of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation may lie in the knowledge or feeling or
personal causation,
(p. 328)

DeCharms relates the issue of perceived locus of causality of
that of control
If we assume, however, that a major factor in the intrinsic
dimension is the desire for personal causation, then
intrinsically motivating tasks are those in which the
person feels that he is in control, that he originated
the behavior (as an Origin) with the concomitant feelings
Introduction of extrinsic
of free choice and commitment.
reward, however, places the person in a dependent position
relative to the source of the reward. To the extent that
the person expects a reward for his task, he is unfree
The
and has not chosen the task for its own sake alone.
his
for
source of the reward is an external causal locus
behavior,
(p. 329)

From the above we see that DeCharms interprets the individual's

perceived locus of causality for his behavior in relation to

questions of freedom and control.

The individual's perceptions

individual
of freedom or control are dependent on whether or not the
him or
perceives the behavior of others as attempting to control

limit his freedom, or whether the individual feels

a

sense of
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personal causation.

On this basis, DeCharms predicts that intrinsic

motivation and extrinsic factors will interact, i.e., that addition
of extrinsic contingencies to an activity the individual finds

intrinsically interesting will be perceived as an attempt at
control or loss of freedom.

DeCharms sees another possible cause for decrement following
reward:
'

The introduction of reward apparently affects the
subject's evaluation of the task itself.
If the task
has been performed without reward and a reward is
introduced, the most obvious effect is for the subject
to attempt to attain the reward with the least effort
possibl e. .One of the effects of an extrinsic reward
upon task behavior, then, is to focus attention on the
reward and this effect may produce a deterioration of
task performance,
(p. 331)
.

De Charms here seems to indicate the nature of the negative

effect of rewards on behavior as both

a

result of cognitive

processes relating to locus of causality and also of interference
processes.

An interference or competing response hypothesis

(Child and Waterhouse, 1952) is postulated by Reiss and Sushinsky
(1975) as a sufficient and necessary cause for what they term a

"decreased play effect."

concept in Chapter

More attention

is

devoted to this

2.

Origins of self-perception and attribution theory
is

as,

cited in both the work of

and of DeCharms.

Heider (1958)
DeCharms notes

"the second seminal concept that influenced our thinking...

Heider'
(p.

Bern

.

s

12).

concept of the perceived locus of causality for behavior"
Origins of attribution theory come through Heider from
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Duncker and Piaget.
to

Heider (p. 66) notes "Duncker did not mean

imply that there is

a

consciously rational process of analysis

into factors present; he talks about an attribution that
occurs

'spontaneously' and immediately."

(Duncker,

1947,

p.

537).

Heider

describes attribution as a process of ordering and classifying:
The immediate act of perception is accompanied by certain
kinds of perceptual activity which increase with age and
are loosely allied with intelligence. He (Piaget, 1950)
describes these perceptual activities under the labels
of decentralization, transportations , comparison, transpositions, etc. .. .Mediating condtions or intervening
circumstances are taken into account not only in the
perceptual mechanisms that make for object constancy,
but also in our behavior and expectations referring to
our own and other people's perceptions.
This ordering
and classifying (of proximal stimuli) can often be
considered a process of attribution. .we find ourselves
in a certain situation, and something happens which has
to be fitted into the situation.
It has to be attributed
to one or another contents of the environment,
(p. 296)
.

Attribution theory concerns itself with the perception of
cause of behavior as opposed to any actual cause of the behavior
(Bern,

1967; Heider,

1958; Jones & Davis, 1955;

It asks the question:

cause of his behavior?

Kelley,

To what does the individual

1967, 1971).

attribute the

An "overjustification hypothesis" has

been derived from attribution theory by self-perception theorists.

Addition of reward to an already sufficiently justified activity
(intrinsically motivated) makes that behavior oversufficiently
justified.

This overjustif ication hypothesis predicts that

a

person's intrinsic interest in an activity can be decreased by
inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means to
some extrinsic goal.

The individual will come to believe that
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his actions are the result of external
contingencies as opposed
to his

intrinsic interest in the activity.

Overjusti fication

theory proposes that it is the re-attribution of
causality from
internal

reasons for one's own behavior to external ones that

accounts for decreased interest in subsequent activity after
reward procedures.

Attribution theory

is

not without its critics.

In work

applicable to attribution theory, Weick (1967) reviewed studies
designed to increase favorability toward

a

dull

task.

He found

that attitude change toward the task (the supposed cause for

change to increased effort) often did not occur in instances of
increased effort.
to

attitude change.

Hence, increased effort could not be attributed

Weick states that:

initial cognitive enhancement of the task followed by
increased effort simply does not occur often enough for
us to be convinced that this is a reasonable explanation.
Instead, it appears that the phenomenon in which we are
interested may involve just the opposite sequence of
events, namely behavioral change followed by occasional
attempts to summarize the experience eval uati vely.
(p. 212)

Weick's discrepant findings on attribution are critiqued by
Bern

(1975) who states,

"One possible explanation (for failure to

find that attributions mediate behavior) is that the measures of

attributions are not well designed or appropriate to the self-

attribution which actually mediates the behavior.

Another possi-

bility is that the subjects are hesitant to admit to some states
like anger.

(Schacter and Singer, 1962)" (p. 51).

Bern

cites

Zimbardo (1969) and Brock and Grant (1963) as suggesting that
the attributions do change as predicted, and do mediate behavior,
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but are unconscious.

Bern

(1965, 1968) has suggested that individuals

need not be able to verbalize the cues they
use in arriving at

self-attributions.

He goes on to cite Zimbardo (1969,

p.

269-273)

as providing a version of unconscious cognitions
generating

empirical consequences, but cautions that they are
close to "meta-

physics and invisibility."
Bern

c'hange.

(1972, p. 52) believes that attributions follow behavioral

The issue discussed in this paper is related not to what

occurred during the original attribution process but to the effects
on future behavior as a result of this attribution process.
In summary,

it appears theoretically that an individual's

perceptions of whether his behavior is intrinsically or extrinsically

motivated (i.e. perceptions of locus of causality or control) can
affect his attitude toward
at that task.

a

task, and, as a result, his performance

CHAPTER

I

I

RESEARCH

This chapter will

review research pertinent to the effects of

rewards on high base-rate behaviors.

performed largely within

This research has been

framework of perceived locus of causality.

a

The process by which man explains and understands his own actions

and their causes has drawn interest in recent years

(Bern,

1967,

1972; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), although discerning

causes of events has been
Kelley (1967) and

Bern

a

central concern of social psychology.

(1967, 1972) suggest that processes of self-

attribution and self-perception function in the same manner as
processes of other-perception.

explicate

Bern's

Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973)

self-perception theory.

When an individual observes another person engaging in
some activity, he infers that the other is intrinsically
motivated to engage in that activity to the extent that
he does not perceive salient, unambiguous, and sufficient
extrinsic contingencies to which to attribute the other's
behavior.
Self-perception theory proposes that a person
engages in similar processes of inference about his own
To the extent that the external
behavior and its meaning.
reinforcement contingencies controlling his behavior
are salient, unambiguous, and sufficient to explain it,
the person attributes his behavior to these controlling
But if external contingencies are not
circumstances.
perceived, or if they become unclear, invisible and
psychologically insufficient to account for his actions,
the person attributes his behavior to his own dispositions,
interests, and desire,
(p. 129)

Lepper et

al

.

(1973) state as one implication of self-perception

theory:
21

.
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an "overjustification"

hypothesis— the proposition that a
person s intrinsic interest in an activity may be undermined by inducing him to engage in that activity as
an
explicit means to some extrinsic goal.
If the external
justification provided to induce a person to engage in
an activity is unnecessarily high and psychologically
over-sufficient" the person might come to infer that
his actions were basically motivated by the external
contingencies of the situation rather than by any intrinsic
in the activity itself,
(p. 130)

Effects of external rewards on intrinsic motivation

.

Deci

(1971)

was the first to experimentally study the effect of external rewards
on intrinsic motivation.

He cites Atkinson

(1964), deCharms (1968),

and Murray (1964) as predicting that external rewards decrease

intrinsic motivation, and goes on to state that "a review of the

literature has yet to receive
Deci

definitive empirical answer"

a

hypothesized that rewarding

a

(p.

105)

person with money or other

tangible reward for performing an intrinsically interesting activity
will

decrease subsequent intrinsic interest in the activity.

He

asked college students to solve interesting puzzles in three

experimental sessions, rewarding subjects for performance (session)
two in the experimental

During

group.

a

group and not rewarding

a

similar control

break in each session subjects were allowed to do

whatever they wished, including working on puzzles.

Subjects in

the reward group showed a greater decrease in instrinsic motivation

than those in the control group.

Results were of a level of

significance not customarily considered acceptable in the literature
.

10 >

p

>

.05,

and are referred to as "marginal" by Lepper et

al

(1973).
In the same article,

Deci

reports on two other experiments

23

tending to confirm his hypothesis:

significance, and
but using verbal

monetary rewards.

a

a

field experiment of marginal

third using the same general design as the first

rewards and positive verbal feedback in place of
Linder this

tion tended to increase.

Deci

feedback condition, intrinsic motivagives two reasons for failure to

reconcile his findings with those of the animal literature (see

Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Uhl and Young, 1967):
the finding of continued activity after removal of rewards
in studies with subhuman species may be accounted for
more parsimoniously by the process of resistance to
extinction than by an increase in intrinsic motivation.
It is suggested that human data might be fruitfully
viewed using a cognitive approach, since humans have
greater cognitive control over their own behavior and
motivation.
A cognitive approach to this problem would
focus on the changes in the phenomenological interpretation of the task following the introduction of external
rewards.
Second it is suggested that distinctions should
be made among the different kinds of external rewards.
(p. 107)

Deci's (1975) Cognitive Evaluation Theory is an attempt to

integrate experimental findings:

Proposition I:
One process by which intrinsic motivation
can be affected is a change in perceived locus of causality
This will cause a decrease in
from internal to external.
intrinsic motivation, and will occur, under certain circumstances, when someone receives extrinsic rewards for
engaging in intrinsically motivated activities, (p. 139)

Proposition II:
The second process by which intrinsic
motivation can be affected is a change in feelings of
If a person's feelings
competence and self-determination.
of competence and self-determination are enhanced, his
If his feelings of
intrinsic motivation will increase.
competence and self-determination are diminished his
(p. 141)
intrinsic motivation will decrease,
Every reward (including feedback) has
Proposition III:
aspect and on informational
controlling
a
aspects,
two
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aspect which provides the recipient with information
about his competence and self-determination. The
relative salience of the two aspects determines
which process will be operative.
If the controlling
aspect is more salient, it will initiate the change
in perceived locus of causality process.
If the
informational aspect is more salient, the change in
feelings of competence and self-determination
process will be initiated,
(p. 142)
He introduces a distinction based on whether the rewards are

perceived by the individual as controlling his behavior, as

dpposed to providing feedback,
Lepper
is

,

et al.

(p.

107)

(1973) state that the overjustification hypothesis

"formulated in terms of the perception of oneself as having

undertaken an activity in order to obtain some extrinsic goal"
(p.

130), that the nature of the goal

should be of little signifi-

cance, and, that "contracting explicity to engage in an activity
for

a

reward should undermine interest in the activity, even when

the reward is insubstantial

and Lepper'

s

or merely symbolic"

(p.

130).

Deci's

predictions are reconcilable in that verbal rewards

are rarely the subject of contract.

Deci suggests that verbal

rewards are not seen as rewards, but rather as providing information.

Expectedness of rewards

.

Provision of an unexpected reward following

the activity should have little effect on subsequent activity,

despite its magnitude, according to Lepper et

question of expectedness experimentally.

al

.

,

who studied the

They chose children as

subjects for their experiment on the basis of demonstrated interest
in the activity

(drawing with magic markers) during baseline, then

assigned them randomly to three groups:

one group where children

.
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received no reward and were not expecting one, one where
children

contracted to perform an activity and were subsequently rewarded
with

a

good player award, and one group where children were given

the good player award not having expected it.

Children in the

expected award condition spent significantly less time playing with
the markers than children in the other conditions.

Lepper et

al

cite the fact that children were selected on the basis of high
initial

interest as

a

possible reason for their finding that receipt

of reward did not act as a reinforcer to increase interest of

children in the unexpected reward group.

Jung (1968) substantiates

this suggestion that "achievement [in a learning experiment] is a

reward itself...

The level of motivation can be considered

sufficiently high so that it is difficult to manipulate it by
experimental treatments." (p. 22)

Lepper also found the quality

of pictures drawn in the expected award condition to be lower than
the other groups, as based on ratings by three judges.

They take

this, and the finding of decreased duration of activity, as

evidence of the overjustification effect.

Surveillance effects

.

Lepper and Greene (1975) expand on prior

research to conclude that surveillance also can act as

attempt at control of one's behavior.

a

perceived

They cite Strickland's

1958 study, in which subjects served as supervisors over two

subordinates, in

a

situation of relatively high surveillance over

one and relatively low over the other.

Despite the fact that

workers had performed equally well, supervisors saw the high
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surveillance workers as motivated primarily by the surveillance,
as less internally motivated, less trustworthy, and less likely
to perform adequately in the absence of surveillance.

Subjects

subsequently chose to monitor the previously monitored worker more
often,

insuring

a

circular process.

Bern's

self-perception theory

suggests that the worker in the situation operated on the same

attributional data to conclude that his behavior was the result
of the external contingencies.

His initial

interest had been

undermined by pressure.
Lepper and Green randomly assigned preschoolers to high, low
and no surveillance conditions orthogonally by expectation vs. no

expectation of reward.

Reward consisted of

a

chance to play with

attractive toys (see Premack (1965) on preferred rewards).

Subjects

receiving an expected reward were subsequently less likely to play

with the experimental puzzles when these puzzles were available
in a free-play situation.

No significant differences were found

between high and low surveillance conditions, but
for surveillance was found.

a

main effect

Surveillance produced an additional

decrease in later interest in the activity.

Lepper and Greene

conclude that "The knowledge that one's performance at

a

task is

being observed and evaluated by someone else, even when there is
engaging in the
no explicit expectation of a tangible reward for
the task"
activity appears sufficient to decrease later interest in
(p.

484).

Lepper and Green interpret the results in light of the

further conclude
Strickland 1958 study and self-perception theory to
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that if we "observe an actor engaging in an activity when extrinsic

pressures are great, we would attribute his behavior to the external

contingencies of the situation," and that "use of overly sufficient
pressure to induce
a

a

person to engage in an activity may produce

self-sustaining and self-fulfilling cycle since both the source

and recipient of the pressure would be subject to the same attributional

'bias'"

(p.

485).

They state that "the teacher or supervisor

comes to believe that the child or worker is motivated only by
external pressure and therefore maintains that external pressure,

while maintenance of the pressure leads the worker or child to
believe that he is performing as

a

result of external factors, thus

making him less likely to engage in the behavior subsequently"
485).

(p.

This study is also noteworthy for the fact that frequency

of performance is measured, as well as duration, with significant

results for frequency.

Interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
(1975b)

.

Calder and Staw

studied the relationship of external and internal factors

on the same behavior.

They manipulated both intrinsic and extrinsic

motivation to test for interaction, as opposed to additivity of
the two factors.

College students were randomly assigned to one

of four groups on two orthogonal dimensions,

a

money versus no

and
money reward condition (extrinsic versus non-extrinsic)

a

blank

verus
versus picture puzzle condition (intrinsically motivating

non-intrinsical ly motivating.)

To avoid confounding with factors

Calder and Staw chose
which could lead to alternative explanations,
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as their activity one which could be labelled intrinsically

interesting in one case but not the other, would differ on an

affective (enjoyabil i ty) dimension as opposed to

a

cognitive or

behavioral dimension, and yet would consist of the same overt

behavior.

Dependent variables were

a

task satisfaction questionnaire

and the number of minutes for which subjects volunteered for future

experiments.

For the blank puzzle, ratings of enjoyabil ity increased

with introduction of monetary reward, while for the picture puzzle
ratings of enjoyability decreased with introduction of reward.
This finding supports deCharms

1

1968 hypothesis predicting the

interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

The pattern of

mean amount of time volunteered for future experiments followed the

pattern for ratings of enjoyability but did not reach statistical
significance.

Calder and Staw attempt to account for both rein-

forcement effects and (overjustification) effects reported in the
literature.

when

a

They expect "an inverse (or self-perception) effect

task is initially high in intrinsic interest and

(or reinforcement)
a

a

direct

effect when there is initially less interest in

task" (p. 600).

Calder and Staw (1975a) reviewed Deci's pre-1975 work and made

methodological observations, including the following:

1)

Deci did

not report performance data, leaving interpretation open to

explanations of

satiation

or fatigue rather than a cognitive

re-evaluation of the task, and 2) there is the possibility that
individuals perceived the extrinsic reward as

a

bribe (Steiner, 1970)
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and that it is this reaction to the reward,
and not

intrinsic motivation, that
spent at the activity.

is

a

decrease in

responsible for decreases in time

In a reply,

Deci

(1975a) reports perfor-

mance data and states that since there are no
significant differences
in performance data,

fatigue and satiation are not acceptable

alternative explanations.
and Lewis'

Deci goes on to cite Kruglanski, Alon

1972 finding that intrinsic interest for an activity

decreased when individuals received unexpected rewards after they
had performed interesting activities as evidence that the issue
of

expectedness of rewards is not resolved.

The bribe theory would not

be relevant to an unexpected reward situation since the activity

would already have been performed when the reward was presented,
and thus the individual would not see the reward as an attempt to

induce the activity as in

a

bribe.

Contingent vs. non-contingent rewards
Calder and Staw (1975a) feel

a

.

Both Deci

(1975a) and

need for further research on whether

or not both contingent and non-contingent rewards decrease intrinsic

motivation.
and Zeevi

Calder and Staw (p. 79) state that Kruglanski, Friedman,

(1971) found a decrease in intrinsic motivation for the

extrinsic, non-contingent reward condition in their experiment,
the difference being that the reward (a tour) was not contingent
on performance of the activity, as in the 1972b Deci experiment, but

rather on participation or non-participation in the experiment.

Calder and Staw posit that "contingency makes rewards more salient
as extrinsic forces," and that,

"both contingent and non-contingent
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rewards decrease intrinsic motivation, but contingent rewards

produce the largest (sic) change" (p. 79).

Measures of intrinsic motivation
Deci and Lepper et al

.

.

(See also Deci, 1975)

Calder and Staw (1975a) criticize

studies for using persistence on

their single measure of intrinsic motivation:

a

task as

"there are other

indicators which can and should be used in assessing intrinsic

motivation.

Perhaps the most obvious indicator is reported task

satisfaction, since one certainly should like

a

task if he is

willing to perform it for no other apparent reward"
Kruglanski measured task enjoyment in 1971.

Deci

(p.

79).

(1971) measured

task satisfaction, interest, and enjoyment for both experimental and
(1972) and Lepper et al

(1973) measured

control groups.

Kruglanski

for preference.

Thus, measures of intrinsic motivation other than

persistence have been used in the literature.

Content-consequence hypothesis

.

Kruglanski

(1975) based his

distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on whether
the person's self-attributed cause for an activity inheres in its

content or its consequence.

He states that the distinction is akin

to the distinction between stimulus and circumstance

and Valins (1971) and Valins and Nisbett (1971).

of Nisbett

This distinction

suggests that when money, or, presumably, any tangible reinforcer,
is inherent to the task,

its presence should enhance intrinsic

motivation, since it provides

a

salient intrinsic cause for

task, its
performance, and, that whenever it is extrinsic to the

-
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presence should lower Intrinsic motivation.

orthogonally

a

Kruglanski varied

task dimension consisting of either

guessing game (money intrinsic) or
(money extrinsic task) with

a

a

coin-toss

model construction task

payment dimension where subjects

were given either points or the equivalent of
currency.

a

He found that subjects manifested

a
a

few cents in

higher degree of

intrinsic motivation when payment was present versus absent for
the money intrinsic condition, on the basis of three questions

relating to interest and preference for the activity in relation
to alternative activities.
In a conceptual

"Athletics Game" and

replication, Kruglanski substituted an
a

"Stock Market Game" for the former task

variables and told subjects in the money intrinsic, payment absent

conditions that they would be requested to return their cash profits.
The dependent measure consisted of the subject's self-reported

willingness to continue with the same game or to play another game.
Kruglanski interprets the similar results for the replication as
well as the previous experiment as lending support to the hypothesis

that when money is intrinsic to

a

task,

its presence tends to

enhance intrinsic motivation, and that when it
presence lowers intrinsic motivation.

is

extrinsic, its

He claims that this result

supports his content-consequence distinction, but not the internal
external distinction made by Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b), since

salient, external rewards heightened intrinsic motivation in an

activity in one case and lowered it in another and hence cannot
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be a sufficient condition of extrinsic motivation.

In both

conditions, monetary payment was contingent on degree of competence.
Krugl anski

believes that his findings argue against identifica-

tion of intrinsic motivation with satisfaction of subjects' self-

determination and competence needs, since in one case payments
raised intrinsic motivation and in another lowered it.

Kruglanski

states that in the money-extrinsic, payment-absent case, the

discontinued expectancy of reward could have led to frustration due
to non-reward and thus exacerbate the aversiveness experienced thus

accounting for decrement.

He conducted "funnel -type postexperi-

mental" interviews yielding no signs of frustration or discontent.
This procedure is questionable in view of research indicating

subjects' reluctance to admit unpleasant emotions (Schacter & Singer,
1962).

Despite Kruglanski
with

a

's

claims, the findings are not inconsistent

control versus information interpretation.

Krugl anski 's

work confounds reward-as-consequence of an activity with reward-

under-the-discretion-of-another (but still as consequence).

His

research does not discriminate between circumstances where reward
is

the consequence of an activity (or inherent reward) and where

reward is the consequence of activity but is under the control of

another.

Under this interpretation, subjects in the money-intrinsic,

payment-present, condition could have seen the reward as an indicator
of performance.

Under Deci's 1975 cognitive evaluation theory

money-intrinsic condition
(see Chapter V), for example, reward in the
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would not be seen as controlling since coin toss games typically
accord the coin to the winner.
of causality would occur.

informational.

In the

Hence, no change in perceived locus

Subjects would see the results as

money-extrinsic, payment-present conditions,

subjects could have seen provision of monetary reward as attempting
to

influence (control) their subsequent participation in activities,

or their participation in the activity at hand.

In

the money-

intrinsic, payment absent condition, subjects may have seen removal
of rewards as control by others, initiating

a

change in perceived

locus of causality and diminishing intrinsic motivation.

In the

money extrinsic condition, subjects would see reward as controlling,
and hence lower intrinsic motivation.

Kruglanski's distinction between perceptions of intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation on the basis of individuals' perceptions

of causality for their activity inhering in the content or conse-

wuence of the activity clarifies the concepts definitional ly.
point that salient, external rewards cannot be viewed as

condition of extrinsic motivation is well taken.
a

a

His

sufficient

As he demonstrates,

salient, external reward is not necessarily perceived as

a

salient,

extrinsic reward, but can, in some cases be considered an intrinsic
part of a situation or activity.

Discounting principle
tional

.

Kruglanski

(1975a)

investigated the attribu-

principle of discounting (Kelley, 1971) to account for the

negative relationship between magnitude or presence of extrinsic
rewards and intrinsic motivation.

This principle suggests that
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presence of extrinsic cause for an activity lessens the
individual's
tendency to attribute causality for his actions to intrinsic
factors (the individual discounts intrinsic reasons), and, conversely,
that presence of intrinsic causes lessens the tendency to attribute
extri nsi cal ly

(Note the similarity of the discounting principle

.

to Bern's self-perception theory.)

Kruglanski provided three

conceptual replications varying on extrinsic versus an intrinsic

task-motivation dimension versus various measures of intrinsic
interest, including subjects' ratings, volunteering time, and

whether an individual was willing to contribute to
organization.

a

charitable

He interpreted his results as indication that "the

extent of (perceived) intrinsic motivation varies positively, and
the extent of (perceived) extrinsic motivation varies negatively,

with the magnitude of task-intrinsic rewards.

.

.the attribution that

the extrinsic pay causes one's performance of the task was lower

when

a

plausible alternative cause, notably task intrinsic rewards,

was present versus absent"

(p.

704).

Subjects in the high intrinsic

reward condition, for example, recommended lower pay for their work
than subjects in a low intrinsic (extrinsic) reward condition.

Magnitude of

a

reward can be expected to correlate highly with

sal ience.

Salience of reward

.

Ross (1975) performed two experiments designed

more
to test whether a highly salient task-contingent reward is

detrimental

to

intrinsic interest than

the first experiment, children in

a

a

less salient reward.

In

salient reward condition were
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shown

a

cue reminding them of the expected reward, while
in the

non-salient reward condition, they were not shown the
cue.

The

subjects in the cued, salient-reward condition played
less with the

rewarded activity in immediate and delayed
did either less-salient or control

second experiment varied,

1)

a

(4

(no reward)

weeks) trials than
subjects.

distraction condition where subjects

were asked to think about an unrelated topic with
reward condition and 3)
to

ideate (control).

control

a

The

2)

a

think-about-

condition where subjects were asked not

Subjects in the distraction conditions and

subjects showed more interest in the activity (drum playing)

than the think-about-reward condition.

The competing response

hypothesis would predict that the distraction condition and the

think-about-reward condition subjects would both subsequently show
less interest in the activity than control subjects,

a

proposition

not born out by the Ross 1975 results.
On the basis of Kelley's discounting hypothesis (1972) stating

that not all of the possible causes of
at

a

a

behavior may be salient

given time, Ross states that it would be possible to maximize

or minimize the salience of external consequences.

He predicts

that a highly salient reward would induce subjects to perceive

their behavior as extrinsical ly motivated, and, conversely, that
subjects would attribute behavior to intrinsic reasons in the

absence of external determinants.

Ross dismisses rival

hypotheses

of satiation or reinforcement of differential activity after

measuring perceived effort and number of thumps as indices or
controls for satiation and differential reinforcement effects.

.
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Ross performed a second experiment to increase
general iz-

ability of results.

Ross measured instrinsic interest immediately,

on the basis of duration of contact with the drum,
the first toy
that the child contacted during free play and a question
by the

experimenter as to the most "fun thing" in the room.

He measured

duration and first toy contacted in the delayed assessment

(4

weeks).

Ross found that subjects in the distraction and control conditions

showed more interest in the target activity.

He states that "The

comparison between the distraction and control conditions supports
the evidence from Experiment One that an anticipated reward need

not reduce intrinsic motivation."

decrease in intrinsic motivation

He goes on to state that a
is

most likely to occur when the

reward is salient, that it varies as
the reward.

/

a

function of the salience of

He states that "distraction will

(not) always be

beneficial to intrinsic motivation" and posits that distraction

would be more likely to disrupt activities requiring greater
concentration, and that the task in his experiment was fairly
mechanical

Frustration and delay of gratification effects

.

Ross goes on to

note that the attribution hypothesis does not provide the only

possible explanation of the results.
often involve

a

Intrinsic motivation studies

delay between the promise and attainment of reward.

Frustration generated by waiting for the reward may become associated
with the task and make the task aversive.

Mischel and Ebbesen (1970)

and Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss (1972) found that cues which increase
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the salience of anticipated rewards

reduce young children's

ability to delay gratification, possibly by increasing
the aversiveness of the delay period.

"The greater and more vivid the anticipa-

tion of the reward, the greater frustration generated
by its

delay

(p.

335).

Mischel reasons that conditions decreasing

attention to an anticipated reward should reduce frustration, making
it less aversive to wait.

Ross discusses how Mischel's theory is

supported by his Experiment Two, in that subjects who were distracted
during the activity, and thus from the reward, did not show

decrease in intrinsic motivation.

Ross notes,

a

"asking subjects to

ideate did not seem to reduce their activity on the drum... differences during the free-play period cannot be readily attributed
to either satiation or
(p.

reinforcement of differential activity"

251).
As Ross notes,

frustration theory cannot account for other

variables such as surveillance (studied by Lepper and Greene, 1975)
or deadlines (studied by Amabile, DeJong and Lepper, 1976).
(1976)

tested

a

delay of gratification hypothesis:

temporal association of the task with

a

that it is the

frustrating delay period

which produces the decrement in intrinsic motivation.
(1974) demonstrated that

a

Ross

Mischel

waiting period between promise of reward

and its attainment produces frustration for young children.

Ross

cites Lepper et al.'s (1973) findings that unanticipated reward

does not produce decrement as support for his hypothesis, since
if reward is not expected,

there is no frustration at its delay.
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He also cites Piaget (1970) as suggesting that the young
child
is

incapable of dealing with several aspects of

a

situation

simultaneously, due to the egocentric nature of his thought and
small

capacity to shift attention

to another.

from one aspect of

situation

a

They delay of gratification hypothesis requires less

cognitive ability than an attributional perspective, which requires
that the child consider multiple plausible causes for an activity
at once.

(Bern

suggests this consideration need not be conscious.)

Ross suggests that these delay periods do not produce frustration
in an adult.

Attribution theory vs. delay of gratification hypothesis
states that attribution theory asserts that it

is

.

Ross

the contingency

between task and reward, while the delay of gratification hypothesis
proposes that it is association of reward with delay, which is

primarily responsible for decrement.
ments:
a

a

Ross contrasted three treat-

control condition where no reward was promised or given,

condition where subjects were presented with

a

reward contingent

upon their waiting for an experimenter to return, and

a

condition

where subjects were presented the reward contingent upon performance
of the same interpolated activity as conditions one and two,

performed in the experimenter's absence.

Frustration or delay of

gratification hypothesis proposes that it

is

the subjects' waiting

for the reward which causes decrement, and hence both experimental

conditions should produce decrement.

The attribution hypothesis

of
predicts that only where reward is contingent on performance
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the task, and not contingent on the wait, would

a

decrement occur.

Ross also used an individual difference measure
of delay of

gratification based on Mischel and Gilligan's (1964) scale to

determine whether the delay period would be more frustrating
to
subjects who have little ability to delay gratification.

No main

effects were found for the delay of gratification variable.

Subjects

in the waiting contingent condition played with the activity (Bic

Banana pens) for

a

significantly longer period of time than the

subjects whose reward was contingent on performance of the task.

These data support the attributional or over justi fication analysis
and are not consistent with the delay of gratification hypothesis.

I

Competing response hypothesis

.

Other attempts to explain over-

justification effects include Reiss and Sushinsky's (1975) explanation of these effects in terms of the competing response hypothesis

of Child and Waterhouse (1952).
is an

The competing response hypothesis

interference interpretation posed by Child and Waterhouse

as an alternate, sufficient explanation for low quality of play

These latter

data presented by Barker, Dembo, and Lewin (1941).

authors interpreted these data as indicating regression caused by

frustrating constructiveness of play.

Barker, et

posed the competing response hypothesis as one of

al

a

.

had originally

number of

possible explanations for decreased constructiveness; they rejected
it as a sufficient explanation.

Child and Waterhouse (1952) state that,
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children showed a lower constructiveness of play
in
the frustration situation than in the free-play
situation. .frustration of one activity will produce
lowered quality of performance in the second activity
to the extent that it leads to the making of
responses
that are incompatible with or interfere with the
responses of the second activity. This may be called
and interference interpretation,
(p. 191)
.

Child and Waterhouse introduce the notion that competing

responses interfere with quality of performance.

Reiss and Sushinsky

pose the following as responses capable of interfering with play:

perceptual distraction, cognitive distraction, excitement in

anticipation of reward (Miller and Estes, 1961; Sheffield, 1966).
Perceptual distraction would involve looking at the reward, for

example, and cognitive would involve thinking about the reward.
Reiss and Sushinsky (p. 1118) imply that cognitive distraction is
the factor accounting for decrement in the Lepper et
study.

al

.

1973

Reiss and Sushinsky cite McCullers and Martin (1971),

Miller and Estes (1961), and Spence (1971) as demonstrating the
distracting effect of material rewards.
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) propose that "for any particular

play activity there exists

a

set of responses that facilitates task

enjoyment" (p. 235), including attention to the activity, performance
of the activity in the absence of aversive affect, at a relaxed
pace, and successful

performance.

Responses that interfere with

responses that facilitate task enjoyment are called competing

responses and include "performance anxiety, frustrative delay of
reward, embarrassment or guilt if the reward is perceived as

socially inappropriate, hurried rates or performance.

.

.and visual
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and cognitive distraction" (p. 235).

They state further that

exposure to two reinforcing activities such as intrinsically

motivated activity and reward may arouse approach-approach conflict.
Possible explanations for persistent loss of intrinsic motivation
due to competing responses include:

1)

the arousal of unpleasant

affect leading to aversive Pavlovian conditioning,

2)

recognition

by the subject that he did not enjoy the activity, and 3) arousal

of competing responses impairing quality of performance, with the

subject's recognition of the impairment mediating

a

persistent

effect.

Reiss and Sushinsky state "that

competing response hypothesis

is

a

major prediction of the

that many decreased play effects

are stimulus novelty effects that weaken over repeated trials of

reward contingent on performance quality."

The prediction is

based on the assumption that responses interfering with task enjoy-

ment also interfere with responses facilitating performance quality
(Farber, 1955).

Thus, making rewards contingent on quality of

performance should extinguish responses which compete with

performance quality and enjoyment.
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) stress their interpretation of

Lepper and Greene as well as Calder and Staw's studies as being

a

function of robust stimulus novelty effects as opposed to any
effect on the individual's intrinsic motivation.

Reiss and Sushinsky

state that the results would therefore not be similar in studies

using multiple-trial procedures.

They state as evidence of their
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assertion that "the available evidence from control
group studies

consistently reveals that token enconomies are associated
with
positive response generalization" including feelings of
self-

confidence and

a

tendency for internal attributions of behavior

(Disci pio & Trudeau,

1972; Maley, Feldman, & Ruskin, 1973; Reiss,

1973; Reiss & Sushinsky,

1975,

Experiment Tewo; Eitzen, 1975)

(Reiss & Sushinsky, 1976, p. 234).

Reiss and Sushinsky state that it is sufficient but not

necessary for any competing response to produce

a

decreased play

effect, and, that while Ross (1976) and Greene and Lepper (1974)

studied frustrative delay of reward and performance anxiety,

respectively, other competing responses could have interfered
with the activity in question and thus negatively affected play.

Testing the competing response hypothesis

.

In

order to compare

the over justification hypothesis directly with the competing

response hypothesis, Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) performed two
experiments.

The first replicated the Lepper et

while not confounding exposure to

a

no-promise of reward.

a

.

(1976) studies

distracting stimulus with verbal

instructions defining the stimulus as

exposure vs. no-exposure to

al

a

reward.

The authors varied

tangible stimulus with promise vs.

Expectation of reward was assured by asking

questions of the subjects, and repeating instructions if it was

apparent the instructions had not been understood.

Subjects in

the exposure-promise condition listened to a target activity (a

song) less on a pretest than subjects in the no-exposure, no-promise

.r
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test.

A main effect for pre-exposure was not
statistically reliable

but the main effect for promise of reward showed
that individuals

promised

a

reward would be less likely to engage in the
activity

subsequently.

Demonstration of

a

pre-exposure effect could have

been interpreted as support for the competing response
hypothesis,
but not for the overjustification hypothesis.

interpreted easily from

a

Results could be

competing response or over justification

perspective.

Experiment One had been designed to maximize the likelihood

subjects would think about the reward at the expense of listening
to and enjoying the music.
a

Experiment Two was designed to produce

rei nforcement effect without interfering with behavior practiced

during experimental training.
predicts that
is

a

The competing response hypothesis

decreased play effect will not occur if the behavior

not interfered with by

a

reward.

Experiment Two involved rein-

forcing nine children for listening to one song and not reinforcing
them for listening to two others.

of giving each child

a

Discrimination training consisted

token after the child had listened to the

target song for scheduled but varying lengths of time (token two15 seconds;

token three--20 seconds; token four--35 seconds; token

five--20 seconds).

As evidence for the success of discrimination

training, the authors note that two fo the nine subjects listened
to the target song when songs were first introduced,

but that seven

went to the target song following the discrimination training.
Means of 350 seconds vs. 145.6 seconds were found for time spent
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listening to the target song vs. time spent
listening to the
preferred non-target song.

Reiss and Sushinsky cite these means

and the fact that six subjects had listened
to the target song

more than to either of the other two songs

(p.

>

.04 binomial

test)

as evidence that target song preference engendered
by discrimination

training had transferred to

a

post-test situation and thereby

discontinued the overjustification hypothesis prediction of

decreased interest in the target song.

Criticism of competing response hypothesis experiments
to Reiss and Sushinsky,

.

In reply

Lepper and Greene (1976) question whether

children may have perceived implicit or explicit social contingencies
in the post-test situation, whether they were responding on the

basis of the demand characteristics of the situation (Orne, 1962,
1969; Miller,

1972).

Demand characteristics include such factors

as adult expectation of the children.

Other contingencies would

include expectation of reward at post-test due to presence of

discriminative stimuli.

Lepper and Greene also question the effects

of such factors as increasing familiarity with the target song
(Zajonc, 1968) and changes in liking for the non-reinforced

alternatives.

Lepper and Greene criticized failure to provide

control groups which would "allow an examination of the aftereffects
of the reward programs per se, unconfounded with other changes in

classroom procedures and/or changes in adult behavior" (p. 32)
accompanying token economy introduction.

A control would serve

to help discern whether "potentially controlling extrinsic
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contingencies" determine the extent of the generalization.

Kazdin

(1973) states that the contingent social behaviors and
systematic

observation techniques taught classroom or hospital personnel
do
not disappear when tokens are not available.

If behavior

is

contolled by powerful extrinsic contingencies, it cannot be
classified
as intrinsically motivated behavior.

An alternate explanation for these results involves the

possibility that subjects expected reward at post-test.

Discrimi-

native stimuli which could have mediated this expectation include

presentation of the tape recorders and songs used in the training
procedure, the presence of outside observers, and being in

a

in groups of three,

No

as well

as combinations of the above.

room

evidence is provided by Reiss and Sushinsky that subjects did not
expect

a

reward, nor do they report telling the subjects they

would not receive

a

reward.

Reiss and Sushinsky attempt to refute Lepper and Greene's

criticism that situational cues mediated expectation of reward by
noting that the only similarity between training and post-testing

conditions was the presence of observers, and different observers
in each case, with no interaction with the children, and that "the

children seemed to ignore the observers."

The assumption that the

presence of observers was not noticed by the children and that
this presence of strangers observing their behavior had no effect
as a discriminative stimulus relating training to testing situation
is

open to question.

Not enough information is provided to
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determine whether presentation of reward was
confounded with verbal
procedures, which have been shown by Deci to
increase intrinsic

motivation.

Behavior contrast effects

.

Lepper and Greene (1976) criticize

Reiss and Sushinsky for suggesting that previous
token economy

studies would lead the reader to dismiss
tion hypothesis.

a

priori the overjustifica-

Specifically, Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state

that "a much more detailed account of reward procedures,
including
the effects of saliency and amount of reward, already exists"
(p.

1123).

The behavior modification literature has dealt

with

decreases in behavior following termination of reward under the
term "successive behavior contrast" (Dunham, 1968) which refers to
a
is

behavior's increasing and remaining above baseline when reward

available but decreasing below baseline when reward contingencies

are withdrawn.

Deci

(1975) states that the lack of findings of

behavior contrast effects may be due to the use of animals in
the investigations.

Lepper and Greene (1976) also note that the

behavior contrast phenomenon is discussed in the animal research.
The assumption implicit in both Deci and Lepper and Greene is that

animals would presumably not be capable of cognitions relating to
perceived locus of causality or to overjustification.

Reiss and

Sushinsky suggest dismissal of the Lepper work because behavior
drops to baseline levels but not below baseline when rewards are

withdrawn, and, that neither negative (contrast) or positive

(generalization) effects have typically been found in attempts to
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assess generalization of token system
effects to non-prograrrmed
environments, (Johnson, Bolstad and Lobitz, in
press; Kazdin and
Bootzin, 1972; O'Leary and Drabman, 1971).

Lepper and Greene

(1976) note instances of contrast effects in studies
where

appropriate comparisons are available in non-programmed
settings:
Colvin, 1973; Johnson et al., in press; Meichenbaum
et

al

.

,

1968.

Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state that, "no reinforcement

procedure employing tangible rewards has produced deleterious
'side
effects' beyond chance levels" (p. 1123).

Winett and Winkler (1972),

Feingold and Mahoney (1975) and Levine and Fasnacht (1975, 1976)
speak of side effects in situations where their production is

unlikely to be measured.
Lepper and Greene draw
is a

a

conceptual line between behavior which

function of environmental contingencies and behavior occurring

in the seeming absence of salient external

basis of work by Collins

(

contingencies.

On the

1973), Kelman (1958), and Rosenhan (1969),

they state that the same treatment may have one effect in settings

where external constraints are present and another when constraints
are absent.

Rosenhan found, for example, that techniques most

effective in promoting compliance with an adult norm also were
least effective in promoting internalization of that norm, as

evidenced by subjects' subsequent behavior in their classroom, in
the absence of external

pressures.

Assuming the Rosenhan factors

operate in the Reiss and Sushinsky study, one might conclude that
Reiss and Sushinsky merely measured at the wrong time to find
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contrast effects, and that had the experimenters
or other

discriminative stimuli not been present, results
would have been
more similar to results reported in the
overjustification literature.
Re-solved puzzle.
is no longer

Reiss and Sushi nsky state that "Since

puzzle

puzzling once solved, Rice (1946) noted that
interest

in re-solving the same puzzle is likely to
be low (cf.

1933).

a

Rosenzweig,

Rice suggested that the rewarded beahvior in such
situations

be defined as

'solving previously unsolved puzzles' so that reward

for solving Puzzle A increases the probability that the
subject
will
to

solve Puzzle B" (p. 239).

Reiss and Sushinsky are also open

the re-solved puzzle criticism, since in their study, post-

testing of subjects was on songs that had been rewarded and listened
to 10 times.

If overjustification effects generalize, while Reiss

and Sushinsky

elevated

the rate of the particular song-listening

behavior, they may have decreased song-listening behavior in general
or of listening to new songs.

Because of subjects' perceptions of

attempts to control their behavior, in the future they might tend
to avoid the controllers of their behavior or experience psychological

reactance.

Note also that the overjustification hypothesis would

predict decreases in time spent listening to the particular song
upon leaving a situation where reward procedures as discriminative
stimuli were present.

Qua! ity of play

.

Reiss and Sushinsky criticize Lepper and Greene's

work for confounding differing practice experiences with experimental
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training conditions.

Specifically, they state that promised-reward

subjects practiced hurried and/or low quality play
prior to reward,

compared to other subjects.
that

a

Citing Logan (1972) the author's reason

subject "who practices

manner learns to behave in
& Sushinsky,

that the

1976, pp.

a

a

response in

a

sloppy and inefficient

sloppy and inefficient manner," (Reiss

1057-1058).

Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state

capacity of salient rewarding stimuli to elicit responses

that interfere with ongoing behavior can be assumed to habituate.
(Reiss and Wagner, 1972).

When rewards are introduced children

often become excited and consequently exhibit low-quality performance"
(p.

1118).

Reiss and Sushinsky predict that these "stimulus novelty"

effects will subside as excitement subsides during repeated trials,
and that decreased play effects will not be associated with multipletrial

contingent procedures.
Demonstration of

is

a

relationship between quality and duration

necessary for one to claim that interference with quality accounts

for decrement.

Ross (1976) found a nonsignificant (r=.19) correla-

tion between quality of drawing and persistence or amount of time

spent prior to reward attainment.

Lack of correlation between

quality of drawing and amount of time spent is interpreted as
refutation of Reiss and Sushinsky's interpretation of Lepper and
Greene's work.

Lepper and Greene (1973) and Greene and Lepper

(1974) found that subjects in expected reward conditions produced

lower quality drawings prior to receiving the reward.

necessary to

a

It would be

distraction explanation based on interference with

.

.
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quality to demonstrate

a

duration, since such

criticism claims decrement as

a

direct relationship between quality and

rewarding low quality drawing.

a

result of

Rewarding low quality play could

not be an explanation for decrement in the Ross
work since decre-

ment and low quality of play do not correlate.

Lepper and Greene

(1976) also take issue with Reiss and Sushinsky's suggestion
that

children learned to engage in low-quality play.
by'

Calder and Staw (1975), Deci et

(1972),

Kruglanski et

al

.

al

.

They cite studies

(1975), Kruglanski et al

(1975), Smith (1975), and Ross et

(1975) as well as unpublished research by Greene et al

al

(1974) to

substantiate their assertion that performance differences during
treatment "are not necessary to produce subsequent decrements
in intrinsic motivation to engage in tasks subjects had previously

contracted to engage in for tangible rewards" (pp. 29-30).

Weaknesses of the competing response hypothesis

.

Reiss and Sushinsky

interpret the Ross (1976) study in terms of performance anxiety as
the competing response.

They base their conclusions of superiority

of the competing response hypothesis as an explanation of Ross'

results on the basis of

a

non-statistical ly reliable difference

between means in Ross' wait-contingent and control groups.

On

this basis they claim that the competing response hypothesis

explains the Ross results better than the overjustification hypothesis,
since,

"wait contingent procedures alleviated performance anxiety

perhaps by encouraging children not to perceive the task as

evaluative" (p. 240).

Note that Reiss and Sushinsky use

a

cognitive
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explanation (perception of evaluation) relating
to locus of
control

(one is evaluated by another).

Thus, their explanation

does not change the nature of the causality
involved, but removes
the locus-of-control antecedent one step from the
behavior:

cogni tion--decrement versus cogni tion--interference--decrement.

Similarly, they interpret the task-contingent condition as
enhancing

anxiety (presumably because of cognitive recoil or reactance at
evaluation).
is

If an affective state such as anxiety or frustration

responsible for decrement via an interference, then it should

be measurable or demonstrable.

Judgment will be reserved until

such data are available.
Thus, Reiss and Sushinsky

1)

base their conclusions regarding

superiority of the competing response hypothesis over the justification hypothesis on data that are not demonstrated to be statistically

reliable, and

2)

do not change the nature of the cognitive explana-

tion for the behavior, but see it as followed by

a

mediator, the

presence of which is not demonstrated, only speculated.
is

seen as the direct antecedent of decrement, with

process the antecedent of the interference.

a

Interference

cognitive

Interference might

thus be seen by Reiss and Sushinsky as the vehicle as opposed to
the cause of the decrement.

Reiss and Sushinsky interpret Calder and Staw's work showing
an increase in interest in a boring activity which was rewarded
as follows:

"diversion of attention away from

a

boring activity

should enhance enjoyment by competing with attentional responses
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that facilitate boredom" (p.
241).

Contrary to Reiss and Sushinsky's

assertion, an increase in the blank
pictures activity for rewarded
groups is predicted, since, with reward
provision, subjects have

justification for engaging in an uninteresting
activity.
The competing response hypothesis fails
to specify both the

conditions under which interference occurs
(what makes
interfere) and the differential
(v/hy

a

response

interference of rewards on behavior

does a response interfere with some responses
and not others).

For example, why would not a competing response
interfere with

those responses associated with performing the
activity in spite
of its boring character instead of interfering only
with the responses

facilitating boredom?
others?

In the Ross

Why do some responses interfere and not
study, why does frustrative delay not interfere?

Without clear specification of both conditions under which interference occurs, and parameters for differential response interference, an opportunistic interpretation of data is possible.

Reiss and Sushinsky re-interpret results of the Lepper, Sagotsky
and Greene (Note

1)

study cited by Lepper and Greene as supporting

the over justi f ication, as opposed to the competing response, hypothesis.

Reiss and Sushinsky specify an approach-approach attentional

conflict as being highly distracting and aversive.

They indicate

as responses capable of competing with responses that facilitate

task enjoyment:

anxiety, frustration, embarrassment, guilt,

perceptual and cognitive distraction, and approach-approach decrement
and responses mentioned by Reiss and Sushinsky as competing with
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responses facilitating task enjoyment has not been attempted.

Note

that it is not reward that distracts from performance necessarily,

but cognitions or affective states induced by presentation of
reward.

Until

such a relationship is established, and the affective,

perceptual and cognitive states demonstrated following prediction

of such effects, no positive preliminary conclusions can be drawn

concerning the competing response hypothesis.
the effects and the relationship will

Demonstration of

not, however, disconfirm the

overjusti f ication hypothesis, since the overjustification hypothesis
does not dispute that some responses do interfere with behavior.

Reiss and Sushinsky dismiss findings of attribution studies
on the basis that one of the preconditions for the overjustification

effect

the salience of reward, and, that making

is

also makes it distracting.

a

reward salient

This appraisal of reward procedures does

not explain how, for example, reinforcement effects can be produced,

since if

a

reward is always distracting one would always expect
Since this does not appear to

decrement following administration.

be the case, one must assume that making a reward salient does

not always make it distracting, or, that distraction (interference)

does not always provide decrement.

Furthermore, an examination of

research other than that specified by Reiss and Sushinsky reveals
results in accordance with overjustification predictions,

competing response explanations would have

more to account for the same results.

to be

where

broadened even

For example, it seems

unlikely

that the prospect of getting course credits would distract from
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or interfere with performance in
Weick's (1964) study.

Weick

found an increment in groups where course
credits were withdrawn.
Reiss and Sushi nsky further note that a
single trial of reward
will
trial

not tend to identify the targeted behavior,
but that multiple

procedures will.

Operational ly, for Reiss and Sushinsky,

identifying the rewarded behavior would involve
producing

a

forcement effect during training.

a

As noted earlier,

such

rein-

demonstration may not be possible with high base-rate behavior
(Jung, 1968).

Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) state:

the major point of our experiment is that it is of much
greater interest that the subsequent decreased play
effect fails to occur when stimulus novelty and other
competing response effects are controlled for by the
production of rei nforcement effects,
(p. 239)
By insisting that reinforcement effects be

a

control, they are

limiting the discussion to non-high base-rate behaviors, by their

definition, since an elevation of base-rate is not easily achievable
for an already high base-rate behavior.

Counter conditioning

.

Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) posit a counter

conditioning procedure to explain decrement:
The major prediction of our competing response hypothesis
is that many decreased play effects are stimulus novelty
effects that weaken over repeated trials of reward
contingent upon performance qual i ty. .based on the assumption that for many activities, most responses that interfere
with task enjoyment also compete with responses that
Hence reward contingent
facilitate performance quality.
upon performance quality should often constitute a counter
conditioning procedure that extinguishes responses that
compete with both performance quality and task enjoyment.
.

(p.

Call

235)

A the reward, B enjoyment, and C quality.

Reiss and Sushinsky
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suggest that because A interferes with
always), making A contingent upon

competing with

B

and C,

i.e.

B and C

(although not

should extinguish responses

C

produce an increment in

B and C.

One might expect decrement if conditioning, rather than Reiss
and Sushinsky's posited counter conditioning were operating.

In

order for Reiss and Sushinsky's analysis to follow logically, one
would have to assume that somehow A, the reward, changes in

character from an entity that interferes with responses to an entity
that enhances them.

conditioning.

The only mechanism specified is one of counter

Strictly speaking (Staats, 1975), counter conditioning

involves presentation of an additional stimulus more powerful

positively (in this case) than the negative aspects of the original
stimulus.

Note that no additional

stimulus is presented here,

since quality of task performance could only have been changed if

reward has an accelerative as opposed to an interfering effect on
the behavior.

It is

necessary that the counter conditioning stimulus

elicit the new response more strongly than does the original

conditioned stimulus (Staats, 1975,

p.

26).

Reiss and Sushinsky seem to refer not to

procedure, but to

a

procedure where

a

a

counter conditioning

reward changes in character

from an entity that interferes with task enjoyment and quality to
an entity which becomes reinforcing, based on its association with

aspects of the behavioral situation (quality of performance) with

which it formerly interfered.

A weakness of this explanation,

employing both conditioning factors and what Reiss and Sushinsky
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call counter conditioning factors concerns
its failure to specify

the conditions under which either factor
occurs.

Thus,

if both

conditioning procedures are equally likely (since
conditions for
their occurrence are not specified) we are left
with

explanation with very little predictive value.

a

supposed

This lack of

predictive value is underscored by Reiss and Sushinsky's
discussion
of the relationship between competing responses and
task quality

and enjoyment.

They note that work by Church (1969), Farber (1955),

Freedman (1966), Sanders and Baron (1975), and Solomon
(1964)
indicates that responses interfering with enjoyment do not always

interfere with quality, and that, in some cases (Church, Solomon),
noxious stimuli facilitate performance,

(p.

315)

Observe that Reiss and Sushinsky do not specify the conditions
under which performance and quality correlate.
cited by Ross (1976,

446)

p.

Also note research

investigating the relationship between

quality of task performance and task enjoyment (as measured by
duration) finding no quality-duration relationship.

Finally,

Reiss and Sushinsky exempt socially inappropriate rewards (of which

rewarding an intrinsically motivated activity is an instance) from

circumstances under which they predict stimulus novelty effects to
subside.

Note that an assumption behind work on locus of control

or overjustification effects has to do with the individual's

cognitive appraisal of

a

behavior-reward situation as to its propriety,

including social propriety.
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Competing response:

suffi cient but not necessary .

Proponents of

the competing response hypothesis have
not demonstrated its merit
as a necessary condition for response
decrement following reward.

One might expect, however, that it would
be

decrement.

a

sufficient cause for

Reiss and Sushinsky predict that interference
at reward

will diminish with progressive presentations of
reward.

prediction could imply

1)

This

that subjects' perceptions of reward

change (reward diminishes in salience) with progressive
familiarity
and 2) that as reward becomes progressively familiar,
its infor-

mational aspects become more salient as its controlling and/or

interfering aspects decrease.

Note that in either case, the original

presentation of the reward can be expected to have deleterious
effects, and that the original

presentation or association of

reward with behavior will commonly occur at the introduction of
the activity.

One might expect, on this basis, that interfering

aspects of reward will be associated with novel situations.

implication would involve

a

An

decrease in an individual's probability

of engaging in novel activities.
A circumstance differing from

and

2

above can be derived

from Premack's (1965) demonstration that

a

more preferred activity

1

has reinforcing properties toward a less preferred activity.

While

it may be that interference accounts for decrement in situations

where the reward is more preferred than the activity, it seems

unlikely that
will

a

reward less preferred, less salient than the activity

interfere with that activity.

Correspondingly, we would expect
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it not to produce frustration at removal, excitement
in anticipa-

tion, etc.

Research has shown that

evaluation relating to

a

a

reward can produce an

locus of control

(overjusti f ied, hence

must be controlling) which has deleterious effect on the behavior.
Locus of control

'

.

Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state that the

behavior modification literature strongly suggests that
perceived locus of self-behavior is a relatively unimportant variable for understanding the effects of reward
procedures on overt behavior. Specifically, a critical
determinant of overt behavior is not perceptions of
behavior as a consequence of reward...but rather perceptions of reward as a consequence of behavior, ability
or luck, as well as the subject's perception of the
motives of the reinforcing agent (p. 1123).

Available research casts doubt on Reiss and Sushinsky's
assertion relating to locus of control; Weiner and Dubanoski (1975)
found that duration and quantity of responses were greater when

students selected their own schedule of reinforcement as compared

with others who had their schedules selected for them.

A study by

Amabile, DeJong and Lepper (1976) found that in the absence of
external constraints, students who had deadlines imposed for

a

series of interesting games spent less time at those games than

students who did not have deadlines imposed, regardless of whether
the deadline was explicit or implicit.

Chapter

V

deals with the

locus of control concept at greater length.

Research by Kruglanski (1975) investigating the effects of
rewards inherent to the task's content vs. rewards perceived as

consequence of this activity sheds light upon this question.
will

a

Reward

be perceived as a consequence of behavior, ability, or luck
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providing the reward is concimitant with or an inherent
aspect of
the activity or situation.
to control
a

If the reward is perceived as an attempt

the individuals behavior,

consequence of reward.

as follows:

A plausibility statement could be made

Behavior will be seen as

the extent (as a function of)

reward.

the behavior will be seen as

a

consequence of reward to

it is (its being) a consequence of

One might add that to the extent that reward is used in

an attempt to control another's behavior,

attempt at control.
direct.

it will

be seen as an

The relationship will be functional but not

Work by Brehm (1966, 1972) reviewed in Chapter

V

indicates

that to the extent that rewards are seen as attempts at control of
the individual's behavior, the individual will

react against the

control such that his own control of the situation will be restored.
(See also Skinner, 1971)

Summary

.

Research investigating an overjustification effect

reviewed in this chapter.

This research demonstrates

a

is

negative

effect on behavior subsequent to rewarding that behavior.

Though

the research is done primarily from a perception-of-intrinsic versus
a

perception-of-extrinsic motivation perspective (or perceived locus

of causality), the behavior will be characterized as high base-rate
for purposes of this paper.

A self-perception or perceived locus

of causality theoretical background is used for most of this
research.

Questions of perceived locus of causality are related

to social

conditions surrounding reward procedures and are based

on self- and other-perception.

An individual

perceives that his
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behavior is externally (internally) caused
on the basis of perceptions of external and internal cues relating
to whether his

behavior

is

individual

insufficiently or oversuff iciently justified.

If an

sees his behavior as oversuff iciently justified
he will

see it as externally controlled.

Relative intrinsicity is thus

a

perception based on cues interpreted by individuals with
predispositions to interpret or apprehend information from

relative

i

a

perspective of

ntri nsici ty-extri nsici ty, a perspective based partially

on the individual's past experience.

(See work by Rotter in Chapter

V)

Frustrative delay of reward as the factor producing decrement
is

investigated with negative results.

is used by

A competing response hypothesis

behaviorist theorists in an attempt to explain findings

of this overjustification research "more parsimoniously."

Competing

response theorists have not demonstrated that their concept will
subsume the findings of the overjustification research.
logical

Methodo-

problems with the over justification literature, elucidated

by competing response theorists, are addressed in the following

chapter.

An experiment is designed to shed light upon stimulus

novelty questions, as well as to investigate generalization of

overjustification effects.

CHAPTER

I

I

I

METHODOLOGY

Chapter III concerns itself with the following:

1)

An hypo-

thesis relating to the generalization of the deferred negative

effects of reward procedures on high base-rate activities is
presented; 2) Methodology issues raised earlier in this paper will
be discussed for purposes of explaining how the experiment designed

avoids the methodological criticisms raised in Chapter II; and
3)

Materials and testing procedures for this experiment are

described.

Presentation of hypothesis
to

.

Chapter

II

discussed research relating

the deferred negative effects of rewards on behavior.

Of

perhaps more interest than the negative effects of rewards on
individual behaviors is the possibility that these negative effects
will

generalize to other behaviors.
To recapitulate, an overjustification hypothesis has been

proposed by self-perception theorists.
that

a

This hypothesis states

person's intrinsic interest in an activity can be decreased

by inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means
to some extrinsic goal,
a

and,

that the individual will, through

self-directed inference process, come to believe that his actions

are the result of external contingencies as opposed to his intrinsic
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interest in the activity (Lepper et al., 1973).

Intrinsic interest

mentioned above has been inferred from an indicator:

amount of

time spent on subsequent performance of the activity,
in studies
by Ross, Deci, Calder & Staw, and Lepper and his colleagues.

Studies by Kruglanski et

al

.

(1971, 1975) and Goodman and Friedman

(1969), using other indicators of intrinsic motivation, have seen

intrinsic interest as the factor under study and not merely amount
of time spent.

As noted earlier,

there have been problems with

the concept of intrinsic motivation.

This paper sees perceived

locus of causality as the critical factor, i.e., whether an individual

sees himself as intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated.

Operationally, we are interested in whether rewards, as response
contingencies, can alter the duration of

a

particular behavior

despite that behavior's not having been rewarded previously.
Simply stated, the thesis

is

this:

That the deferred negative

effects of rewards on behavior will generalize.

Given

a

certain

class of activities (high base-rate) for which the overjustification

effect is valid, if some of these activities are rewarded, then
other activities which are similar to these rewarded activities
will

be performed for less time than if the rewarded activities

had not been rewarded.

If it can be shown that the overjustification

effect generalizes, then to the extent that duration of time spent
on an activity

is an

indicator of how likely an individual is

to learn while performing that activity, we will

have shown that

we can negatively affect the learning process by rewarding certain

behaviors.
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This is

a

simplified example:

if rewarding individuals for

reading adventure story books (an
enjoyable, or high base-rate
activity) negatively affects the amount
of time spent reading
books concerned with American history,
then we are negatively

affecting the amount of history the individual
learns.

Methodological issues

.

To examine the hypothesis that the over-

justification effect generalizes, an experiment was designed
to
compare groups whose performance of an activity follows reward
of similar activities to groups not rewarded for performance of

similar activities.
to the subjects.

Activities used were novel and interesting

Rewards were salient (Ross, 1975), inmediate

(Ross,

1976), contingent (Deci,

(Deci,

1972a,

1972b).

1972a,

1972b,

1975), and equitable

To maximize generalization, trials were

made proximate in time (Walker, 1969), constancy of physical
location (Walker, 1969), type of reward (Kruglanski, 1971; Lepper,

Greene

Nisbett, 1973; Lepper and Greene, 1975), and individual

&

providing the reward.
Behavioral contingency relations in daily life are so complex
and occur with such regularity, that attempting to alter or

isolate

a

particular sequence of behaviors will be subject to

contamination by everyday reward procedures.
the more artificial

individual

A decision to use

testing was made because of the

expected relative loss of treatment (reward) strength when so many
other behaviors are present in the stream of behavior.
testing constitutes a high reactive arrangement.

Individual

The obvious
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connection between treatment and post-testing provides
another
source of reactivity.

validity

Nevertheless, the superior internal

achievable in an individual treatment process, due to

more complete control, outweighs the merits of external generalizability concomitant with

a

less reactive method.

(See Orne, 1962;

Weick, 1976b for advantages of field studies)
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) identified

a

critical difference

between the overjustification hypothesis and the competing response
hypothesis as whether or not decreased play effects are stimulus

novelty effects which would not be associated with multiple trial

contingent reinforcement procedures.

Reiss and Sushinsky predicted

that with repeated trials, initial excitement at introduction of
reward would subside, that multiple-trial contingent-reinforce-

ment procedures would not elicit responses which would interfere
with rewarded behavior, and that decreased play effects would not

occur under such reinforcement procedures.
The experiment designed examines the extent to which over-

justification effects generalize to other activities.

It also

examines the merits of Reiss and Sushi nsky's competing response

hypothesis predictions in relation to high base-rate activity.
To investigate and control
1)

a

for stimulus novelty predictions:

criterion activity was used which had not been previously

rewarded, 2) more than one rewarded trial was used, 3)

a

comparison

of two control groups gave an indication of the effects of stimulus

novelty in the experimental situation.

4)

Rewards were chosen
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subjectively and, on the basis of previous research, to provide
minimal cognitive and visual

interference while remaining salient

enough to produce the cognition in subjects that they were performing the play activity "in order to" obtain the reward.

Rewards here are provided immediately upon completion of
the activity.

involves

a

Research investigating frustrative delay of reward

delay from promise of reward to provision, as opposed

to delay from completion of activity to provision of reward.

Frustrative delay would most likely be greater at provision of
reward for low base-rate activities, since subjects in high baserate activities are already engaging in the activity they might
be expected to prefer--the activity as opposed to the reward.

Staw (1976,

p.

15)

had observed that, although studies by

Deci and Lepper & Greene support that expectation of reward can

decrease intrinsic motivation in the activity,

a

source of ambiguity

involves whether the decrease in intrinsic motivation is
of administration of or withdrawal of reward.

Kruglanski et

al

.

result

Research by

(1971) avoids this ambiguity in that reward is

never withdrawn from experimental
group.

a

subjects in the experimental

A frustration effect is thus not adequate to explain

these results.

investigates

a

Ross (1976), in research described earlier,

frustrative delay hypothesis and finds it wanting.

Reiss and Sushinsky criticize the overjustification research
for making intrinsic motivation

a

function of the intrinsic interest

situation.
in other activities available in the free play

In the
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experiment designed for this paper, this factor will be partially
controlled, since only one activity was provided at criterion
in
the experimental

situation.

ever, be considered

a

Time spent at criterion could, how-

function of the interest in regular class-

room procedures including activities which the subject left or

anticipated upon his return to class.
Another criticism of the overjustif ication literature concerns
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) and Feingold and Mahoney's (1975)

contention that had

a

reinforcement effect been induced, no decre-

ment would have occurred.
tion of

a

Note that in this experiment, demonstra-

reinforcement effect would have been dependent upon the

extent of generalization from reward procedures, since the criterion

activity has not been rewarded previously.

Stated another way,

no reinforcement effect would occur on the criterion activity,

since it had not been rewarded (reinforced).

Reinforcement effects

would depend on the extent to which effects of reward procedures had

generalized from treatment to criterion activities.

demonstration of

difficult as

a

reinforcement effect becomes progressively

behavior's base-rate increases.

a

Observe that

Jung (1968) notes

learning experiments motivation is of such

that in verbal

a

level

that other factors cannot be expected to increase level of

performance.

Most of the studies described in the preceding

chapter used duration of the rewarded activity subsequent to reward
as a criterion.
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Expe rimental design
the Solomon (1949)

.

The experimental design was patterned after

four group design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Nursery school children were randomly assigned to four
groups.
Group one (El) played with four different activities, to be

described later.

Duration of the first activity was measured

for possible future comparison with replications of the experi-

ment.

Activities two and three were rewarded contingent upon

their performance.

Activity four was unrewarded, but was again

measured as to its duration.
activity.

Activity four served as the criterion

Duration of activity has been interpreted as an

indicator of intrinsic motivation or interest in an activity.

Group two (Cl) performed the same four activities as group one.
Again, trials one and four were measured as to duration.

group two, which served as

a

control

But in

for group one, rewards were

not provided upon performance of activities two and three, nor
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for activities one or four.

Group three did not perform activity

one.

It served as a control

for effects of pretesting in group

one.

Activities two, three and four were performed by group

three;

two and three were rewarded contingently upon their

performances as in group one.
in all

groups.
four.

Activity four was unrewarded, as

groups, but was measured as to duration, again,

as in all

Group four performed and was measured on only activity
It served as a control

for the effects of experimental

treatment in group three and for unrewarded performance of activities
two and three in group two.

By comparing activity four for groups four and two, one can

estimate the effects of prior unrewarded trials on performance of
an activity.

By comparing activity four, group four with activity

four, group two, we can determine what effect progressive familiarity

with the experimental setting has on results.
two had been in the experiemental

Subjects in group

setting three times previous to

their performance trial on activity four.

Subjects in group four

were entering the experimental setting for the first time.

progressive familiarity with the experimental setting were

If
a

factor,

differential results for groups two and four should be expected.
experimental
One might also expect that the less the effect of the

setting, the more externally general izable the results.

Findings

question hypotheses
that no differences exist could lead one to
of overinvolving stimulus novelty effects on an explanation

justification effects.
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Stimulus novelty effects, if they are

a

factor, can be expected to

occur not only for the reward in the
experiment but also for

introduction of other novel stimuli, including
the activities
serving as rewarded responses in this
experiment.

Thus,

if

stimulus novelty effects interfere with
behavior, as Reiss and

Sushinsky suggest, one might expect

a

comparison of control group

one to control group two would clarify the
relationship.
control

Since

group one is participating at criterion in an
activity for

the fourth time and control group two participating
for the first
time,

the competing response hypothesis would predict that
subjects

in group one would spend longer at the task due to
ebbing of

interference associated with novel stimuli.
In summary,

the experiment was designed to study the effects

of generalization of reward-effects while avoiding major problems

with the overjustification literature to date.

Perceptual and

cognitive distractions, including excitement in anticipation of
reward and frustration resulting from delay or withdrawal of
reward, were to be minimized.

This was accomplished on

basis and amounted to choosing

a

a

subjective

reward which was not of such

great significance to the subjects as to induce frustration at
removal or excitement in anticipation.

Perceptual distraction

was avoided by placing the reward out of sight.

Criterion activities had not been performed by the subjects
prior to their measured performance.

This procedure avoids problems

relating to satiation and differential skill levels between reward
and control groups as

a

result of practice.

Use of

a

previously
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unintroduced activity disarms criticisms relating to Rice's

observation on interest in previously solved puzzles.

Since this

procedure avoided association of reward with criterion, criticisms
relating to interference with activity by reward would not be
expected to apply since activity had not yet been performed and
could thus not have been interfered with.
An explanation of these results in terms of interference is

made more difficult by the choice of reward similar to typical
reward procedures used with nursery school children.

One might

expect that their novelty as stimuli, and hence interfering capabilities, would not be great since they are analogous to typical

classroom procedures.
Certain advantages ensue as
four group design including

novelty effects, and

2)

a

1

)

a

result of using the Solomon-

an opportunity to

i

nvestigate stimul us

replication of treatment effects.

Campbell and Stanley (1963) state that the actual

instabilities of

experimentation are such that "if these comparisons,
O

2

>

O

4

,

>

0
^

are in agreement, the strength of the inference is...

increased" (p. 24).
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The Solomon is intended for use where
each observation is based
on the same instrument.

that case, 0

In

4

0
3

and 0
2

could be compared to 0

of the inference.

^

this study,

In

could be compared to

greatly increasing the strength
and O
3

activity from observations
4 & 3 and 2 &

1

2,

4,

5,

consist of

a

different

and 6 , and hence observations

cannot be directly compared.

Campbell and Stanley

suggest (p. 25) that a 2x2 analysis of variance is
the appropriate
statistic to examine results of the experiment performed
in

accordance with this design.
(for Observations

2

,

4,

5,

disregarded in the ANOVA.

Only post-test scores are examined

and 6 ), with pre-test scores being
A pretest vs. no pretest factor would

be crossed with a reward vs.

no-reward factor.

Diagramatical 1 y
No Reward

(control

Reward
(experimental

pretested

°4

°2

unpretested

°6

°5

FIGURE

3:

Each observation
represents time
spent on activity 4

ANOVA representation of reward by pretest factors

With the addition of an experimenter factor we are left with

2x2x2 ANOVA, completely crossed.

a
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Analysis of the data was performed using
three factors were:

1)

three way ANOVA.

a

The

reward vs. no reward (groups one and three

compared to groups two and four),

2)

pretesting vs. no pretesting

(groups one and two versus groups three and four), and
3) Experi-

menter One versus Experimenter Two.
Experiment Two was similar to Experiment One with the following
exceptions:

only one experimenter was used in Experiment Two and

Activity Two was replaced by an activity more similar to the
criterion activity than the second activity in Experiment One.
Use of one experimenter in Experiment Two enabled dropping
in the ANOVA,

leaving

a

a

factor

2x2 ANOVA examining a pre-test vs. no

pre-test factor crossed with

a

reward vs.

a

control

group factor.

Results of Experiment Two are compared non-statistical ly with
those of Experiment One.

Experimenter and subjects

.

beginning of the experiment.
of the nursery school

Only one experimenter was used at the
Time restrictions imposed by one

directors would have resulted in the testing

of only eight subjects per week.

Any further complications would
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have necessitated enlisting the cooperation of different schools
or postponing completion of the study for months.

Research by

Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) had indicated "results were not

function of the experimenter's personality."

a

Cascio and Krusell

(1973) used a male and female experimenter "so that it would be

possible to separate the effects of an interaction between the
sex of the experimenter and the sex of the subjects."

1

No inter-

action was found.
On the basis of findings of these two studies and the absence

of reported experimenter effects in the overjustification literature,
no significant experimenter effects were anticipated.

An experi-

menter factor was included in the analysis to control for variation
(Hays, 1973).

Two male experimenters were used.

The addition

of a second experimenter to the investigation, coupled with easy

access to another school and more time provided by the director
of the first school, made possible the collection of data which

serve to replicate the findings of the first experiment while
lending some support to
that

a

a

derivative of the original hypothesis:

direct relationship exists between similarity of rewarded

activities and the degree of generalization of the effects.
Examination of the literature revealed that findings of
interaction of sex effects with reward were limited to
et al.

(1973) and Deci et al

.

a

Deci

(1972b) study using college students.

findings
Since only one experimenter of each sex was used,
between-expenwith
confounded
of sex-interaction would have been
menter effects.
1
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The following studies do not report information on sex differences:
Deci,

1971,

1972b; Deci, Benware and Landy, 1974; and Kruglanski,

1975a, 1975b.

Deci

interaction.

Verbal

(1972a) found

a

sex by verbal

reinforcement

reinforcement increased males' intrinsic

motivation while leaving females' unchanged, while males receiving
no verbal

reinforcement spent less time on puzzles than females.

The sex by verbal reinforcement treatment approached significance
(

p= . 13 )

.

Deci, Cascio and Krusell

(1973)

found that female

subjects who received positive feedback spent less free-choice
time working on puzzles than those who got no feedback.

feedback increased the intrinsic motivation of males.

Positive
Deci

(1975)

interprets as follows:
For females, the change in perceived locus of causality
process was initiated, whereas for males the change in
feelings of competence and self-determination was
initiated.
This implies that the controlling aspect
of positive feedback is more salient for females than
the informational aspect, whereas for males the informational aspect is more sal ient. .Girls are taught to
Frequently girls, and
be more dependent than boys.
subsequently, women, define themselves in terms of
Women will be more likely to become dependent
men.
on the positive feedback from the experimenter .. .Men
are socialized to be more independent and less dependent
Consequently they are less likely to
on feedback.
perceive that they are engaging in the activity for the
verbal reward and more likely to perceive the feedback
(pp. 145-146)
as information about their competence,
.

Deci

(1973) reports finding an increase for males'

intrinsic

motivation following reward in Deci 1971, but this author could
find no such difference reported.

Calder and Staw (1975) used only male subjects.

Ross found
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a

main effect for sex on

a

drum activity but found no interaction.

(Males spent about twice as much time playing drums
as did females.)

Lepper and Greene (1975,

p.

483), Lepper et

Greene and Lepper (1974,

p.

1142) found no sex effects in pretesting

in nursery school

al

.

(1973, p. 134) and

children using tangible rewards.

Analysis of the

research presented above reveals that verbal reinforcement has
produced differential sex effects, and that tangible reinforcement
has not.

Deci used college students as subjects while Lepper and

his colleagues used nursery school

students.

Since sex effects

had been obtained only in experiments using college students, and

there using verbal feedback, and this experiment used nursery school

children with

a

tangible reward procedure, sex effects were not

included in the ANOVA.

Subjects in the experiment were boys and girls from 42 to
82 months, with an

three St.

X

=

61.5.

Children were chosen randomly from

Paul, Minnesota day-care centers.

The experimental setting

in each case consisted of a large room in the same building as

the subjects'

individually.

normal classroom.

Subjects were treated and tested

They were escorted by the experimenter from their

class room to the testing room.

After Ross (1975), experimenters

were unaware of the experiment's purpose.
Subjects were seated at small desks in each case, with the

prospective activity displayed on the desk.

The experimenter

sat at least ten feet to the side of the subjects and at least
six feet to the rear of an imaginary line drawn through the subject's
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shoulders.

The experimenter had in his possession

a

book which

he proceeded to read after explaining the procedure to the

subjects and telling them that he would be reading.

The experi-

menter was instructed to observe the subject's behavior as
unobtrusively as possible, this to minimize the effects of
surveillance (Lepper

& Greene,

1975) and to avoid distraction.

It was anticipated that if subjects'

activities were

terminated by the experimenter, subjects would learn to expect
that the experimenter would terminate further activities, including
the final, measured activity.

It was further expected that this

anticipation of interference could have an extending effect on
the amount of time involved, since subjects would wait until

the

experimenter terminated the activity and thus avoid terminating
the activity themselves.

Consequently, activities one, three

and four had to be altered so as to conform to the time limits.

(Activity Two needed no paring because of its unique interrupted
nature, or possibly because it was not as interesting to the

subjects as the other activities.)

instituted to provide

a

These time limits were

modicum of predictabl i ty as to the amounts

of time needed to complete each four-subject segment of the

experiment.

The experiment had been broken into four-subject

segments to insure that the post-tests would

follow the training

each
sessions after approximately the same length of time for

lengths
subject, thus minimizing variablity due to differential
of time between training and post-test.
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Four activities were used in Experiment One:

activity,

a

drum and record activity,

matching same or different activity.

a

a

magic marker

puzzle activity, and a

Lepper et

al

.

(1973) had

used a magic marker activity in their analysis of the over-

justification effect.

Pretesting in this situation revealed

that subjects, when presented with a complete magic marker set

of 24 markers and unlimited paper supply, would go on drawing

with the markers for lengths of time surpassing half an hour.
No subject was permitted to play more than half an hour,

upper limit was not possible to determine.

so an

Since the original

design involved four trials for each of forty children and later
involved sixty children,
activity.
trial

a

time limit had to be imposed on the

Previous research has used percentage of

period.

a

five minute

It was arbitrarily decided here to use a six

minute limit for the final trial and
pretesting and training trials.

a

five minute limit on

Since subjects had

a

tendency to

use each of the magic markers in the set while drawing, one way
to reduce time spent was to limit the number of magic markers

available.

The number was gradually reduced until most subjects

were finishing their activity within

a

One consisted of two magic markers and
paper.

five minute limit.
a

Activity

sheaf of five pages of

More paper was provided if requested, but more magic

markers were not provided.
Ross (1975) used

a

drum on which subjects accompanied

a

record

as a target activity to investigate the effects of salience of
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reward on intrinsic motivation.

The phonograph record which

subjects accompanied as Activity Two was entitled "Songs from

Walt Disney's The Jungle Book and Other Jungle Favorites."

There

were separate songs on the side of the record which was used in
the experiment (side 1).
a

natural

Since the period between songs provided

hiatus, most of the subjects took advantage of the

opportunity to terminate the activity upon conclusion of one of
the songs.

The drum activity further consisted of

stick 8" long attached to

a

as two wooden drums, one 4"

both 5" high.

stick 1/8"

a

3/4" diameter wooden ball, as well
in diameter and another 3"

The drums were secured to one another by

in diameter,
a

large

wooden peg.

Activity Three consisted of
Deci

a

commercially marketed toy.

(1971) used soma puzzles in his experiments with college

students when investigating the effects of rewards on intrinsically

motivated behavior.

Calder and Staw (1975) used puzzles which

they developed for their experiments with college students.

Lacking expertise on the types of puzzles nursery school children
would find interesting, this investigator procured

marketed puzzle.

a

commerically

This puzzle consisted of 3" in diameter by

1/8" thick scalloped circular pieces of crepe foam rubber from

which were cut shapes such as squares, hearts, circles, triangles,
and stars.

There were approximately four pieces to each puzzle.

The name of the toy was "Fi t-a-space,
prises of Phil

1

i

ps-Avon, Maine.

"

marketed by Lauri Enter-

As in the magic marker activity,
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subjects tended to want to manipulate each item.

To avoid as

much as possible the termination of the activity by the
experimenter, the activity was pared from sixteen to three circular
puzzles.

Completion of

a

puzzle provided

a

natural hiatus at

which subjects frequently chose to stop the activity.

Activity Four was again

a

commercially marketed toy, this

time purchased by the investigator on the basis of

a

subjective

initial judgment as to its similarity in interest level and

difficulty to the other activities.
by a nursery school

employees.

This judgment was confirmed

teacher and two experienced children's store

It is called

"Wipe-off Cards, Finding Pairs," and

it is marketed by Trend Enterprises,

Inc.

It consists of

8 1/2"

by 11" pieces of plastic upon which are two columns of line

drawings of animals, people, household items, etc.
to

The pairs

the five drawings in column one can, in each case, be found

among the drawings in column two, with the object ostensibly to

draw lines between the pairs.

Subjects were given three sheets

of this activity and were provided additional sheets if they

requested them.

Experiment Two was identical to Experiment One with the
following exceptions:

only twenty subjects were used; only one

experimenter was used; and the drum activity was replaced by
another wipe-off-cards activity put out by Trend Enterprises,
Inc., chosen in the same manner as Activity Four.

was called "Same or Different."

It

This activity

consisted of 12 sheets, each
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of which had four rows of line drawings.

were four different drawings.

In a column on the left

In each row

were two similar

drawings and one dissimilar (different condition) or two dissimilar
and one similar (same condition).

Subjects were given three such

sheets and provided with additional sheets upon request until
they stopped of their own accord or until, in a few cases,

five

a

minute limit was reached.
Rewards were modeled after those of Lepper and Greene (1973)
and consisted of 5" x 7" plastic cards, bright orange in color,

upon which was pasted
two

2

a

1

1/2" blue foil

star from which emanated

1/2" long pieces of 1/2" blue ribbon.

Harter and Zigler

(1972) had found these awards to be effective rewards.

This

arrangement occupied approximately the left third of the card.
On the bottom one third of the remaining two thirds of the card

was printed GOOD PLAYER AWARD in 1/2" letters.

The upper right

corner of the card was reserved for the subject's name, written
in water-soluble marker, with a flourish, upon completion of the

Good player awards were displayed on shelves to the

activity.

side and rear of subjects, again to minimize distraction.

were not observed to scrutinize the awards.

Subjects

Awards were removed

group
from display for non-rewarded groups and for those reward

trials where reward was not administered.
The following instructions were given to subjects:

Pre-room

:

days to find out
A man has come to your school for a few
some things about how children play.
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Non-reward group
Would you like to come to another room
and play for a short time?
:

Reward group
You will get a reward if you play for a short
time in the next room.
Would you like to come to the room
and win a reward?
:

In room

:

Non-reward group
Here is a (name the toy or activity).
(Show how to use it, do it, what to do.) Why don't you
play with it for a short while.
:

Reward group
This is a good player award which you will
win if you play with this... Do you want to win this award?
If you do win it, we will place it here on the wall with any
other good player awards, with your name on it. After playing
Here is the good player award I promised.
Isn't it nice
and pretty?
I'll put your name on it.
What's your name?
(Experimenter says child's name and writes it.) Let's put
it up here so everyone can see it.
:

Reward group--fina1 activity
This time you will not get
any reward for playing.
Here is the (puzzle, etc.).
(Experimenter explains how to do it.)
:

Experimenters were instructed to answer questions the subjects
asked, but not to engage them in conversation.

Experimenters

demonstrated how to manipulate each activity until the subject
understood, as evidenced by performance of the activity.

Other

activities were hidden before the subject came into the room to

minimize interference.

On all

but Activity Four experimenters

were instructed to stop the subjects at approximately the five-

minute mark unless the subject had previously stopped.

Subjects

were considered to have stopped if they were not touching or
looking directly at the activity for

a

period of five seconds.

Subjects were to be dismissed from the room if they did not play
with the activity within thirty seconds.

That situation did not
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arise.

Subjects were then told they had finished the activity,

thanked for their participation and allowed to leave.
Each block of four subjects was treated in the following

order, with subject one representing experimental group one,

subject two control group one, subject three experimental group
two, and subject four control

group two:

subject one performs

activity one, subject two performs activity one, subject one
performs activity two, subject two activity two, subject three

activity two. .subject four activity four.

The following visual

.

representation will aid in understanding the procedure.
Activity

pretest, experimental
pretest, control

unpretested, experimental

unpretested, control
end

FIGURE

5:

Subject and activity order

Each group of four subjects began and completed testing within

a

three-hour period of time.

Approximately one week after completion of the testing, the
experimenter returned to the schools, explained the experiment
and results to the teacher and students.

A written description

presentation
was provided the teachers for their own use and for
to

interested parents.
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Futur e research

.

One of the difficulties involved in examining

play among children is how to induce them to engage in the

activity.

It is easy to confound duration of activity with

engagement in the activity.

Specifically, as noted by Reiss and

Sushinsky (1975, 1976), the need to coax

a

child to engage in an

activity can cast serious doubt on how intrinsically motivating
that activity is for that child.

Orne (1962) refers to this as

one of the demand characteristics of the situation.

It is not

mandatory to the hypothesis under study that the activities used
be of intrinsic interest to the subjects.

heighten the general izabi

1 i

In fact,

it would

ty of the results were one to determine

that the base-rate of the behavior under study was lower than

what is supposed, since behaviors less intrinsically interesting
than previously supposed would thus be subject to overjustification
effects.

If one's inferences are clearly related to factors

dependent on duration of activity as opposed

to the dichotomous

question of engaging in the activity or not engaging in it, this
methodological problem diminishes in significance.

CHAPTER

I

V

RESULTS

The hypothesis that subjects

rewarded for high base-rate

activities would subsequently spend less time at those high baserate activities than controls was investigated.

High base-rate

activities were in this case operationalized as novel, play
activities.

Two experiments were performed.

pretest versus no pretest

X

experimenter A versus

no-reward (control) conditions.
was tested.

H

:

q

Experiment One varied
B X

reward versus

Specifically the null hypothesis

no differences will

be found in duration of

play activity between subjects previously rewarded and those not

previously rewarded for performing activities similar to the
criterion activity.

H^:

previously rewarded subjects will spend

less time at subsequent play activities which are similar to

previously rewarded activities as compared to unrewarded subjects.
The experimenter factor was included to control for variance rather
than on any theoretical grounds (Hays, 1973).
An analysis of Experiment One was performed using a three-way

fixed effects ANOVA, with replication and with proportional cell
frequencies.

Computational formulas for this procedure are found

by combining procedures for proportional cell frequencies (Winer,
1971, p. 422) with procedures for performing

with replication (Winer,

presented in Appendix

p.

a

three-way ANOVA

Results of Experiment One are

459).

A.
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Experiment Two varied pretesting versus
no-pretesting factors
X

reward versus control factors.

a

two-way fixed effects model with replication.

Experiment Two analysis involved
Data for Experiment

Two are presented in Appendix B.

Experiment Two differed from Experiment One in that the
first
rewarded activity was altered so that it would be more
similar to
the final, criterion activity than the first rewarded
activity,

the drum activity,

increased from

6

in

experimenter

B,

Also, the time limit was

minutes in Experiment One to 12 1/2 minutes for

Experiment Two, since

Experiment One.

Experiment One.

a

ceiling or damping effect was noticed in

This ceiling effect was more noticeable for

with only three subjects reaching the limit of six

minutes for experimenter A, including the pretesting scores.

Prior

testing employed to set limits had been conducted only with experi-

menter A.
In

both experiments time was measured to the nearest five

second mark.

Data were then reduced to number of five second

segments which the subject completed.

Data represented in Appendices

A and B are time in five second segments.

Experiment One

.

Data for Experiment One are presented in Table

One as mean proportions of the six-minute experimental period

during which children played with the criterion activity.
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Reward
Pretest

Reward
Unpretested

Experimenter A

.338

.303

.317

.586

Experimenter

.521

.715

.801

.872

Table

B

1:

No Reward

No Reward

Pretest

Unpretested

Experiment One:
Mean proportions of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment

Table Two represents the same data with the experimenter
factor
pooled.

Reward

No Reward

Pretested

.411

.513

Unpretested

.443

.700

Table

2:

Experiment One:
Mean Proportion of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment, with Experimenter
Factor Pooled.

Table Three represents the same data with both pretesting and

experimenter factors pooled.
Reward
.427

Table

3:

No Reward

.606

Experiment One:
Mean Proportion of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment, with Pretesting Factor
and Experimenter Factor Pooled.

As predicted, children spent less time on a criterion activity

after reward.
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Transformation on data.

Winer (1971) states that moderate
departures

from the assumption of homogeneity of
error variance do not seriously

effect the sampling distribution of the
resulting

F

statistic, but

that the greater the skewness in the
distribution of the population

variances, the more bias in the resulting test
(p. 205).

Olds

(1954) calls for the use of transformations to meet the
assumptions

of the ANOVA,

including constancy of variance, normality of distri-

bution and additivity of effects (p.
ence.

.

5)

"A priori

theory and experi-

.determines the appropriate scale (of measurement)

.

"

Winer

(1971) states that "the logarithmic transformation is particularly

effective in normalizing distributions which have positive skewness"
(p.

(A transformation

400).

is a

change in the scale of measurement

for the criterion.)

Greene and Lepper (1974), in
free choice time subjects spent on
Y‘

= log

e

study measuring percentage of

a

a

task, used the transformation

to obtain more homogeneous treatment variances.

(Y+l)

Lepper and Greene (1973) used the same transformation to analyze
data representing the proportion of time subjects spent on previously

rewarded activities in expected versus non-expected and no reward
conditions.

Ross (1975) used a natural

representing duration of contact with
seconds) since

skewness.

a

a

log transformation on data

drum (possible range 0-300

preliminary examination of his data revealed

Calder and Staw (1975) use

a

natural

log transformation

"since the distribution of time scores tends to be skewed" (p. 603).
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As seen by the following graph,
data for Experiment One is

positively skewed.

Time Spent at Activity

FIGURE

6:

Graph of number of subjects by time spent at activity

On the basis of 1) precedent for the use of transformations in the

analysis of data very similar to those of this experiment (as

documented above,

2)

the positive skew to the data, and 3) to

minimize the effects of lack of homogeneity of error variance,

a

transformation is employed on the data of this experiment.
Winer (1971) states that since in many practical cases the
range tends to be proportional to the variance, we choose trans-

formations based on estimates from the range.

A transformation

which makes the ranges more uniform will also make the variances
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more uniform,

(4.

401).

He presents the truncated range statistic

for use in deciding between transformations.

are represented in Appendix C.

transformation

Y'

=

log

It shows

Data for this statistic

that the natural logarithm

(Y+l) yields the smallest ratio of

e

differences between ranges.

Consequently, on the basis of the

positive skewness of the data and the results of the truncated
range statistic, the transformation

analysis of this data.

Y'

=

log e (Y+l)

is used for

A table showing both untransformed propor-

tion of the experimental

6

minute interval and transformations of

these data are presented as Appendix

D.

Computational formulas and

summary tables for Experiment One are presented in Appendix
Results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table
for these data are represented in Tables 5, 6, and

of

5

7

E.

4.

as mean number

second segments subjects spent at the activities.

df

SV

1

Experimenter
Pretest
Reward
Experimenter
Pretest

X

1

Experimenter
Reward
Pretest X
Reward

X

1

1

1

1

Experimenter X
Pretest X Reward
Within cell

1

32
39

Tabl e
Table

Total

4:

ANOVA Summary for
Experiment One

Means

SS

Ms

.431
.050
.118

.431
.050
.118

16.58**
1.92
4.54*

.001

.001

.04

.011

.011

.42

.025

.025

.96

.041
.832

.041
.026

1.58

F

1.509
F.99 (1,32) = 7.51
F .95 (1,32) = 4.15
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Main effects for reward are significant
at the .05 level of significance supporting the hypothesis that
previously rewarded subjects
spent less time at criterion activity than
controls.

A strong

main effect for experimenter was also
noteworthy.
Reward
Pretest

Reward
Unpretest

E

Unrewarded
Pretested

Unrewarded
Unpretested

E

1

C

2

2

Experimenter A

24.33

21.83

22.83

42.167

Experimenter

37.5

51.5

58

62 75

Table

B

5:

Experiment One:
Mean criterion time in
5-second segments.
Experimenter X
reward condition.

Reward

No Reward

E

C

Experimenter A

23.08

32.50

Experimenter

44.5

60.25

Table

6:

B

Experiment One:
Data in 5-second segments.
Collapsed across pretesting dimension.

Reward

No Reward
C

E

33.79

Table

7:

46.38

Experiment One:
Data collapsed across
experimenter and pretesting dimensions.

Experimenter effect .

It

is

suggested that

a

combination of surveil-

lance, personality, and/or weather factors accounted for the

between-experimenter effect.

Experimenter A started before
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Experimenter

B and

was testing on those spring days when warm

weather had just begun.

Children were reluctant to come indoors

to participate in the experiment and
eager to return to the out-

doors.

Experimenter

returned.

B

began testing after cold temperatures

Opportunities to observe the experimenters at work were

presented in schools one and three.

School one had doors through

which conversation could be heard, and school three had
with

a

a

door

window through which one could listen and watch unobtrusively.

Subjects appeared to be more comfortable with Experimenter

B.

Another possible explanation encompassing both the non-significant
three-way interaction and the general brevity of all trials for

Experimenter A involves his surveillance of the subjects.

menter A observed subjects very closely.

Experi-

Lepper and Greene's

(1976) study on the effects of surveillance indicates that surveil-

lance has much the same effect on duration of activity as reward.

Surveillance seems to inhibit play.
5

- Cl

Thus, the low score in Table

for Experimenter A could be a function of differential

prior surveillance for Cl as opposed to C2.

experimental setting three times earlier.
to the surveillance effect as strongly,

Cl had been in the

C2 would not be subject

since subjects in C2

That is,

had not had prior trials of observed play.

perceived the surveillance more readily as
nities to observe this surveillance, and

2)

a

1)

subjects

result of more opportusubjects perceived the

surveillance effect more readily for Experimenter A as opposed to

Experimenter

B,

since Experimenter A surveyed their behavior more
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closely and obviously than Experiment
It was

was found.

B.

emphasized that no significant three-way
interaction
Despite the apparent disparity of score
Cl for Experi-

menter A, much of the disparity might
be
variable criterion.

a

result of

a

highly

That is, significance was not found due
to

the great degree of variability on the
criterion throughout the

experiment.

Effects were not found for interaction between
experi-

menter and treatment condition.
that some rewarders have

a

Such findings would have suggested

stronger inhabitory effect on subsequent

play activity than other rewarders.

This findings of lack of

interaction is consistent with work by Deci et al. (1973).
By comparing the C2 score with the Cl score, one can get an

impression of the effects of the experimental situation on relative

performance (duration).

Analysis of results shows an overall lack

of significance for main effects or interaction.

reliable differences were found.

However,

to spend more time in the C2 condition,

a

No statistically

tendency for subjects

repeated in Experiment Two,

would bear investigation.
It could be

argued that the smaller amount of time subjects

spent in Cl was due to prior surveillance at pre-test and control

treatments one and two.

In future research

it would be desirable

to unconfound surveillance and familiarity with experimental

setting

effects.

Experiment Two

.

The natural log transformation

Y'

=

log e (Y+l)

was used for reasons similar to the reasons for its use in Experiment
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One, as well as to make results of
the two experiments more

comparabl e.

Results of the ANOVA for Experiment Two are
presented

in Table 8.

Computation appears in Appendix

F.

Formulas used are

from Hays (1973).

SV

df

SS

Ms

1

.009

.009

.533

l

.691

.691

40.89*

R x C

1

.004

.004

.237

Error

16

.271

.0169

Total

19

.974

Pretest
Reward

-

-

no pretest
no reward

Table 8:

(C)

(R)

ANOVA results for Experiment Two with y

F

=

k/150.

Comparison of Experiment One to Experiment Two is not directly
possible with this ANOVA for two reasons:

1)

a

experimenter factor in Experiment One would make
confusing (however,

a

significant
a

comparison

comparison of means for Experimenter

B

within

Experiment One with means for Experiment Two where Experimenter

B

was the only experimenter would be possible), and 2) data for

Experiment Two should be adjusted so that proportion of time spent
is based on an experimental

One.

In

period of six minutes as in Experiment

Experiment One the proportion of time spent on

was x/72, while in Experiment Two it was x/150.

a

task

Thus the same

absolute time spent in Experiment One would represent different
proportions in Experiment One and Two.

were subjected to

a

Data for Experiment Two

second Analysis of Variance where y

=

x/72, as
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in Experiment One,
is

for purposes of rough comparison.

shown in Appendix

H.

Table 9 summarizes the results.

SV

df

SS

Ms

1

.013

.013

.325

1

.566

.566

14.15*

C x R

1

.000

0

Error

16

.639

.040

Total

19

1.218

Pretest
Reward

•,

Computation

-

-

no pretest C
no reward R

*F. 99 (

Table

1

,

F

0

ANOVA results for Experiment Two with
y

9:

=

16 )
*

8.53
x/72

Transforma tion of the scores to original proportion denominator
makes the comparison more meaningful.

No reliable conclusion can

be drawn on the basis of this comparison because of the experimenter

factor effects in Experiment One.

Means of proportions of criterion

activity period used by subjects for Experimenter

B

within Experiment

One and for Experiment Two are presented in Table 10.

E

Experimenter B
from Expertmei

Experimenter

.

B
2

c

E
i

2

C
i

37.5

51.5

58

27.4

30.4

64.8

By Mean No. of 5-

E
2

62.75

72

E
i

c
2

C
2

i

.521

.715

.806

.872

.381

.472

.900

1.000

By Proportion

second Segments

Table 10:

Mean No. of 5-second segments and proportion of
time spent at criterion activity for Experimenter
B in Experiment 1 and 2, by treatment with y = x/72.
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Subjects spent more time playing at criterion
while with Experi-

menter

B

in Experiment One than in Experiment
Two.

In

Experiment

One, activities were less similar to
criterion activities than in

Experiment Two.

In

Experiment One rewarded subjects spent approxi-

mately 62% of time playing while in Experiment Two
spent only
about 29%.

It is this comparison of Experimenter B in
Experiment

One and Experimenter

in Experiment Two that supports

B

the hypothesis

that the more similar the rewarded activities, the
stronger the

inhibition of play on

subsequent criterion.

a

Time spent on a

subsequent activity and similarity of activity seem to vary inversely.
This is not based on

a

statistical

but upon inspection of means.

procedure analyzing the scores,

This comparison is for purposes of

examining the relative effects of more and less similar treatments
to criterion activities.

One and Two shows

a

than Experiment One.

Comparing rewarded groups for Experiments

stronger treatment effect for Experiment Two
Data as analyzed in Experiment Two, ANOVA

number one, more closely resemble the true state of affairs, while
data in Experiment Two, ANOVA number two, are more comparable to
the data of Experiment One.
By comparing data in Table 10, represented as pooled by

pretest factor in Table 11, we see that when treatment (rewarded)

activities are more similar to the criterion activity, the duration
of play activities diminishes.
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Experimenter B,
Experiment 1

1

E

C

44.5

60.38

Y
£
O

E

C

.618

-o

.839

T3

O
3

</>

Experimenter
Experiment

B,
2

28.9

1

68.4

ro

o

.401

.950

o

3
c+

Table 11:

Mean No. of 5-second segments and proportion
of
time spent at criterion activity for
Experimenter
B with pretesting factor pooled,
with y = x/72.

Assuming the amount of time spent on activities to be

a

relative constant within groups across trials (or different
activities), inspection of control means tends to corroborate

interpretation of an inverse relationship between
rewarded to criterion activity and

subsequent criterion activity.

2)

1)

similarity of

amount of time spent on that

The more similar are reward to

criterion activities the less time will be spent at criterion.

Sex effects

.

After data were analyzed, differential sex effects

were investigated for subjects in experimental conditions.
cally, the following hypothesis was investigated:

Specifi-

that no

differences existed in duration of criterion activity times between
male and female subjects in the rewarded conditions pooled.
t-test was performed using formulas in Underwood (1954).

hypothesis was not rejected:

t

a

t

The null

(l-a=.95) = 2.03 with 28 df.

Appendix G contains statistical procedures and formulas.
the critical value for

A

Since

of 28 df = 2.05, we see that the critical

value was quite close to the observed value, thus leaving open to
some question the conclusions that male and female subjects did
not differ.

Males spent less time at criterion, following the
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rewarded activity than did females.

Inspection of means as

presented in Table 12 reveals that control males and control
females differed by only approximately three units, tending
to

cast doubt on hypotheses predicting differences in treatment

conditions (rewarded conditions) between sexes as being due to
main effects of sex as opposed to interaction effects.
study of differential

Further

sex effects should be made, especially since

differences between sexes tended here to be
from that which Deci et

al

.

in the

opposite direction

(1973) found for verbal

feedback

conditions among college students.
C

E

E

2

1

Male

24.13

24.00

46.67

61.71

Female

34.28

36.33

45.5

54

E

Table 12:

a

2

C

Male

24.07

53.25

Female

35.43

50.36

Mean treatment effects x sex for data
pooled across Experiment 1 & 2.

Nature of the decrement
there is

C

1

.

We might speculate that for each individual

task or tasks at which he might spend

a

disproportionately

large amount of time in comparison to other tasks in which he engages

and/or in comparison to other individual's time spent at that task
or tasks.

In Graph 2 below, depicting the experimental

data in

reward versus no reward condition, we see that seven controls spent
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longer periods of time playing at the
activities than any of the

rewarded subjects.

One might speculate that the use of
rewards

decreases the likelihood that an individual
will spend disproportionate amounts of time on an activity, and,
in fact, other similar

activities.

On the basis of the data presented
below, one might

hypothesize that rewarding an individual for high
base-rate
behavior does not so much diminish the amount of
time each individual
spends at each activity, but rather diminishes or
curtails relatively
long term,

i.e.

circumstances.

persistent or perservering, behavior in certain
This speculation is not made as the result of any

statistical procedure, but upon inspection of the data, and should
be viewed with caution.

FIGURE

7:

Graph of number of subjects by time
spent at activity.
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Reflection reveals at least two possible
explanations.
First, individuals in the experimental
group, who are the counter-

parts to individuals in the control group
spending the dispropor-

tionate amounts of time, may have had this
perserverance

activity in question extinguished.

at the

Within the experimental group

there is a certain group of individuals who, had
they been

unrewarded, would have perservered at Activity Four.

possibility is that this group of individuals

is

The first

relatively

constant as to its individual members, i.e. that the same individuals regularly spend long periods of time at certain activities.
The second possible explanation is that each individual

variable from one activity to another.

For

a

is

highly

given activity, any

individual may spend disproportionately larger periods of time.
In

either case rewards tend to inhibit perserverance at activities.

Restated, the alternatives are:

1)

some individuals consistently

spend long periods of time at most behaviors, others at very few

behaviors, and

2)

most individuals spend long periods of time at

some behaviors but not others.
Work by Rotter discussed in Chapter
task by an individual as

a

V

sees persistence as a

correlate of internal ity, defined as

belief in internal control of reinforcement.
at

a

Decreased persistence

task, associated here with reward procedures, would be a

correlate of externality.

a

CHAPTER

V

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

This paper has shown that rewards can negatively
affect per-

formance of high base-rate behavior.
indicates that

a

Evidence has accrued which

cognitive change is assocated with this decrement.

Research was performed for this paper demonstrating the
generalization
of over justi f ication effects.

This finding relates to research by

Rotter on Internal ity-External ity, to be discussed later in this
chapter.

Practical

implications for research described in this

paper are discussed, as are possible means to avoid overjustification
effects, notably self-reinforcement procedures.
The behavior modification literature has addressed the effects

of rewards on behavior.

Literature reviewing behavior modification

literature is examined for references to negative effects of
rewards on behavior.

Reasons for the general failure of this

literature to report negative effects are posited.

The relationship

of behavior modification literature to the overjustification liter-

ature is discussed.

Aspects of the behavior modification literature

are studied to determine under what conditions usefulness of behavior

modification procedures outweighs possible negative consequences.
A general

lack of demonstrable generalization maintenance effects

in token research would tend to support research documenting under-

mining effects to the extent that tokens are perceived as attempts
100
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at control by the subjects involved.

The perceived locus of

causality literature reviewed in this
paper does not dispute
increments in performance during reward
and withdrawal procedures,
but does predict deferred negative
consequences.

Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) describe stimulus
generalization as
the "transfer of effects to other stimulus
conditions or situations,"
i.e.

"whether behavior change is maintained when there
is no

token economy" (p. 359). They refer to response
generalization as
the spread of effects to behaviors or responses
that were not of
initial

focus.

Considerable discussion in the literature has been

devoted to the generalization of treatment effects across time
and settings.

Levine and Fasnacht (1975) note that the abrupt

termination of reward procedures common upon leaving an institution
where such procedures were used, including schools, hospitals, and
treatment programs, constitutes an extinction paradigm, not

generalization paradigm.

a

Turkewitz, O'Leary and Ironsmith (1975)

note that although "many of the early classroom token programs

were withdrawn, the behavior change was not maintained"
et al.,

1965;

Kuypers et

Gripp and Mazaro, 1974)

al

(p.

.

,

1968; O'Leary et

577).

al

.

,

(Birnbrauer

1969; see also

Similarly, many studies have not

found generalization effects of the token program to time of day

when the program was not in effect (Kuypers et al., 1961; Meichenbaum,
Bowers and Ross, 1968; O'Leary et al., 1969; Wolf, Giles and Hall,
1968).

Krasner and Krasner (1973) state that token-induced

behavioral change has not generalized to stimulus conditions not

involving tokens.
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Drabman, Spitalnik and O'Leary (1973) did obtain
generalization,

though their process included
verbal

a

maintenance strategy involving

procedures complicating relatively simple reward procedures,

making them less practical (Levine and Fasnacht,
1975).

Programmed

maintenance techniques such as fading, intermittent reinforcement
and non-contingent reinforcement are not in general use and
will

make procedures more complicated.

Levine and Fasnacht note that

behavior modification studies finding generalization specify

substitution of verbal procedures for tokens.
procedures as

a

They see verbal

main as opposed to maintenance strategy.

Behavior modifiers have recognized different effects for

different types of rewards.

O'Leary, Drabman and Kass (1973) state,

In former studies maintenance (of appropriate behavior)
was not obtained; but in this study it was and the type
of reward appeared to be the only clear procedural difference in these studies.. .If one is using an incentive
program it is probably best to offer the smallest reward
possible in order to obtain the desired results. Such a
conclusion might be drawn from a number of different
theoretical positions including both learning theory
(D* Amato, 1971) and attribution theory of social psychology
(Lepper et al., 1973)... A distinction may be made between
natural reinforcers and small reinforcers, .. .the separate
contribution of small magnitude of reward and natural
aspects of the rewards here used could not be assessed.
(p.

136)

O'Leary et

al

.

go on to recommend "that whenever possible one use

natural reinforcers and the smallest reinforcers necessary to

produce the desired results."

O'Leary and O'Leary (1972) and

O'Leary, Poulos and Devine (1972) recommend the use of minimal

rewards to effect change.

Spence (1970) notes:

The performance of elementary school children in a
two-alternative discrimination task has been found to be

p
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significantly poorer under a reinforcement
condition
In which a material reward
(candy) was given for each
correct response than under a symbolic
reward condition
P
SP ° ken by an ex P er1men ter or a light signal).
(

103)

Direct Integration of the behavior modification
and over-

justification literature was not possible for
reasons described
below.

The overjustification literature concerns
Itself with the

effect of rewards on high base-rate behaviors,
while the behavior

modification literature concerns itself with low base-rate
behaviors.
However, the overjusti

f icatlon

literature Is applicable to the

behavior modification literature to the extent that high
baserate behaviors are Inadvertently reinforced.

Inadvertent rein-

forcement would occur, for example, in circumstances where

contingencies are not sufficiently individualized (Bandura, 1974).
It

includes cases where target behaviors may be of

a

high base-

rate for some individuals, and not others, as when rewards are

applied in an across-subjects fashion.

The overjustification

literature's relation to the behavior modification literature

merits investigation to determine the extent of undermining effects.
Some of the behavior modification work has been done with
animals.

Successive behavior contrast has been investigated

primarily in the animal

literature.

of cognitive factors, the animal

It

is

proposed that because

literature will not be directly

appl icabl e.

Methodological problems In behavior m odi

f

ir.itinn literature

.

A

review of methodological problems found in the behavior modification
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literature will reveal further limitations
on its applicability to
the overjustification literature.

Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) stress

that the use of the ABAB equivalent
time-samples design (Campbell
and Stanley, 1963), often used in the
behavior modification

literature, is appropriate only when the behavior
studied is transient
and reversible.

(See also Kazdin,

1973).

They state "If resistance

to extinction is being tested,

this wi thin-subject design is

inadequate.

the design does not control

In

this instance,

for

the effects of maturation, regression to the mean or
extraneous

change-producing events" (p. 364).

Other aspects of the environment

such as social approval may have changed concurrent with the intro-

duction of tokens.
the subjects will

Staff attention, encouragement and contact with
be greater under conditions of contingent

reinforcement (Mandelker, Brigham and Bushnell, 1970).
Approval and attention effects are confounded with reward

effects.

The effect of instruction or other treatment such as

attention, which covaries with presentation and withdrawal, may
be controlling changes in behavior.

Altering staff to these problems

and detailing changes in staff behavior cannot be expected to

remove these sources of contamination.

rewards in

a

social

The difficulty of providing

situation without also providing attention

compounds these methodological problems.

Kazdin and Bootzin further

note the paucity of behavior modification research dealing with

complex behaviors such as social and language behaviors.

This

latter criticism is shared by Rotter (1975) and Deci (1975).

This
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paucity limits its applicability to such
complex behaviors.
Davidson and Seidman (1974) review methodological
problems

with the behavior modification literature
dealing with delinquent
behavior, including

1)

the failure to use multiple measures:

"no

single measurement operation, behavioral observation
included, is

inherently valid" (p.

100)

(cf.

Campbell and Fiske, 1959, on multi-

trait, multi-method paradigm), 2) failure to establish
baseline

data, 3) failure to rule out maturation, i.e. change might
have

occurred without the experimental manipulation.
note that

82?^

Davidson and Seidman

of studies did not include no-treatment control

groups which would have ruled out such explanation.

Rosenthal and

Rosnow (1969) outline issues relating to 4) the bias of data

collectors, and Davidson and Seidman note,

only one of the studies (of the published literature
from 1960 through June 1973 investigating methods of
behavior analysis applied to the modification of
delinquent behavior) used naive observers ... .many took
place in applied settings with a high premium on
successful outcomes, and that contemporary publication
practices demand successful results,
(p. 1009)
Finally, Davidson and Seidman note that "a considerable portion
of the studies proposed demonstration of behavior and functional

relationships through reversal

s.

.

.only 35% of the investigations

reported reversal data, generally considered necessary for demonstration of functional

relationships" (p. 1005).

A general

criticism

of the behavior modification literature has to do with conceptual

confusion stemming from use of reversal data to indicate the

effectiveness of treatment on one hand, coupled with the observation
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that if the behavior in question reverses upon
withdrawal of rein-

forcement, it precludes any claims to maintenance
or generalization.
Reversal

has been used to indicate both generalization or
mainten-

ance (resistance to extinction) and efficacy of treatment
(cf.
Kazdin criticism, 1973).

Levine and Fasnacht (1976) review other methodological problems
including

1)

insufficient time to reject the extinction processes

(they cite six studies varying analysis of extinction effects

from ten minutes to two weeks and call for at least
2)

a

month),

differential dropout rates (in Patterson, 1974 the dropouts

were more deviant than continuers.
change in groups' -means creiterion),
(Campbell and Stanley,

1963, p.

This would affect Patterson's
3)

regression artifacts

181) are uncontrolled as are

maturational effects in the following studies cited by Ford and
Foster (1976) as refuting Levine and Fasnacht's 1974 article:

Chadwick and Day, 1971; Jones and Kazdin, 1975; Kazdin and Polster,
1973; O'Leary et al.,

1973; Davidson and Seidman,

1974;

Phillips,

Phillips, Fixen, and Wolfe, 1971; Reisinger, 1972, and 4) confounding

effects of social reinforcers with token reinforcers.

Levine and

Fasnacht (1976) state, "we consider these maintenance strategies
to be main treatments that can often replace TP's"
In summary,

(p.

91).

the behavior modification literature would be

unlikely to find negative consequences of reward procedures for the
following reasons:

lack of follow-up; follow-up at incorrect times;

evaluation by biased observers; lack of control for regression and
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maturation artifacts; and the confounding
of verbal and tangible
reward procedures.

Also note that the reversibility of behavior

upon withdrawal of reward has been used
to indicate effectiveness

of reward procedures and thus precludes claims
to generalization
for the procedures.

Research related to perceived locus of causality

.

A preponderence

of research reviewed for this paper suggests that behavioral

decrement following reward procedures occurs as
cognitive change.

Recall

a

result of

a

that overjustification effects can be

conceptualized as instances where individuals react against
perceived attempt at control of their behavior by others:

behavior

is

a

"This

being rewarded by an external agent in addition to being

interesting in its own right.
to perform this behavior."

He is attempting to induce me (control)

This concept has been addressed by

writers other than those concerned with overjustification effects,
notably Brehm and Rotter.
One description of

a

cognitive change that is conceptually

similar to overjustification effects reviewed in this paper
Brehm'

s

(1972) theory of psychological reactance.

is

Brehm does not

address questions of behavioral decrement following reward.

His

theory relates to an individual's tendency to react against

perceived loss of control of his environment.
to a belief by an individual

External

control

in external

Rotter (1966) refers

or internal

control.

refers to an individual's perception of rein-

forcement as unpredictable due to the complexity of forces around
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him,

being under the control of others, or the result
of luck,

fate, or chance.

Internal control

refers to an individual's

perception of the event as contingent upon his behavior
or personal
characteristics:

that he controls his own behavior.

Internal ity-external ity

.

The work of Rotter (1954, 1966) suggests

an individual difference variable relating to an individual's

perception of internal or external control of reinforcement.
Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) note that "almost all

(behavior modifica-

tion) studies report that behavior of some subjects was not

altered" (p. 367), and suggest the possibility of individual

difference variables interacting with token procedures.

Hilgard

and Bower (1966) state "The same objective situation may tap

appropriate motives for one learner and not another, as for example,
in the contrast between those motivated by affiliation

motivated by achievement"

(p.

and those

565).

Rotter developed the concept of internal versus external
control of reinforcement out of his social
1954; Rotter, Chance, and Phares,

learning theory (Rotter,

1972) which attempts to integrate

cognitive and reinforcement theories of psychology.

Rotter suggests

differences between individuals (though not traits) on this
external

-i

nternal dimension and that this variable is of major

significance in understanding the nature of learning processes in

different kinds of learning situations.

(Rotter, 1966; 1975).

Rotters sees internal ity-external ity as learned and includes

seeing oneself under the control of others as promoting externality.
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To the extent that reward or reinforcement
procedures are seen as

controlling, they will be promoting externality.

Implications for

this promotion are great:

*

A series of studies provides strong support for
the
hypothesis that the individual who has a strong belief
that he can control his own destiny is likely to a) be
more alert to those aspects of his environment which
provide useful information for his future behavior;
b) take steps to improve his environmental condition;
c) place greater value on skill or achievement reinforcements and be generally more concerned with his
ability, particularly his failures; and d) be resistive
to subtle attempts to influence him.
(Rotter, 1966
p. 25)

Rotter (1966) sees internal ity-external ity as

individual's reinforcement history.

a

function of an

Phares (1957) found increments

and decrements following success and failure, respectively, to be

greater when subjects believed their performance was
skill

as opposed to chance factors,

Phares'

result of

tending to support theories

portraying internal ity and externality as

reinforcement history.

a

a

function of an individual's

(1957) work indicates that individuals

who achieve success regularly are more likely to be more internal
than if they had not been as successful, that an individual's

relative internal ity or externality will change as

a

his relative success at manipulating his environment.

function of
Clinical

work suggests that an individual can, on the basis of cognitive

actions following

a

decision to do so, change his relative internality

in the form of his beliefs.

(Lazarus and Fay, 1975; Ellis and

Harper, 1975; Ellis 1973).

Behavior is under interactive control, organism interacting
with environment (Bandura, 1975).

Internality and externality tend

no

to be self-sustaining and self-fulfilling.

himself to be

a

An individual believing

pawn of fate will be less active, hence have less

control over his environment, thus ensuring that external

forces

do have a relatively high determining rate for his behavior,

reinforcing his suspicions that he is
Conversely,

a

a

pawn of external forces.

relatively internal person, believing that he has

a

determining role in his interaction with his environment, will be
relatively active, and thus affect his environment more than the
external

individual, confirming his belief that he has an active

role.

Phares (1962) found that subjects perceiving their own control
of a situation, as opposed to subjects controlled by chance, etc.,

exhibited perceptual behavior better enabling them to cope with

potentially threatening situations.

An individual who sees his

situation as chance-controlled learns less than if he were to
perceive it as based on his personal skill.
that "when

a

Rotter (1966) states

subject perceives the tasks controlled by the experi-

menter, chance, or random conditions, past experience is relied
upon less.

Consequently it may be said that he learns less... and

may indeed learn the wrong things (Skinner's superstitious behavior)"
(p.

8).

Strickland (1962) divided subjects into those aware and those
not aware of reinforcement contingency.

Subjects who were aware

of their reinforcement contingency and did not condition were found
to be considerably more internal

who were aware and did condition.

on Rotter's I-E scale than those

Work by Getter (1962) supports

Ill

Strickland

findings that internals tend to resist external

s

manipulation.

Gore (1962) used

a

three-condi tion-of-experimenter-

influence variable (overt control, subtle control, no
control) and
tested length of stories told subsequent to the control

treatment.

Under the subtle control condition, internals told significantly
shorter stories than externals, while no differences were found in

overt and control conditions.

The overt condition produced a

conscious choice on the part of the internals and hence produced
no resistance.

suggestive of

Rotter (1966) calls the results of these studies
a

"kind of negativism to external manipulation on

the part of the internals" (p. 23).

Reactance
logical

.

Brehm (1966, 1972) calls the same phenomenon psycho-

reactance.

Brehm (1966) states "Given that

a

person has

a

set of free behavior, he will experience reactance whenever any

of those behaviors is eliminated or threatened with elimination"
(p.

4).

Brehm notes that when an individual is aware of reactance,

and, by implication, of an attempt at control,

"he will

feel

an

increased amount of self-direction in regard to his own behavior...
he can do what he wants"
as "a motivational

(p.

9).

Psychological reactance is defined

state directed toward the re-establishment of

the threatened or eliminated freedom... it should manifest itself
in increased desire to engage in the relevant behavior and actual

attempts to engage in it" (p. 15).
A logical

extension of Brehm'

in this paper would

s

statements to the work described

include the reluctance to engage in behavior
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prescribed by others.

If the

individual perceives the prescribing

as an attempt at control, elimination of
that freedom occurs:

behavioral

freedom may be eliminated by

a

"A

person or organization

which has considerable power over one, employer-employee;
parentchild; guard-prisoner"

(p.

38) and one might add teacher-student.

As preconditions for elimination of freedom by a social
agent,

Brehm lists having power over someone, attempting to use the power
and surveillance of one's behavior by that social agent.

Surveil-

lance or the imposition of deadlines can be seen as attempts at
control

by a social

agent.

Lepper and his colleagues' work

documenting deleterious effects of surveillance and deadlines as
well

as their work on reward would follow from Brehm's predictions.

Anecdotal evidence of psychological reactance involves Greene's
(1974) report of school children's refusal

token programs.

to participate in

Kazdin (1973) reviews refusal by adult psychiatric

patients and mentally retarded inpatients.

External validity .

To substantiate claims that it is perceived

external control rather than the reward process per se that mediates
an inhibitory effect on behavior, one must establish that other

factors which control but are not rewarding have the same inhibitory
effect.

Experiments by Lepper and his associates demonstrated

inhibitory effects for surveillance and for deadlines.
by Amabile, DeJong and Lepper (1976)

two externally imposed deadlines,

An experiment

investigated the effects of

(implied and explicit) versus

two controls where subjects were asked to work as fast as possible
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and to work at their own pace.

Subjects in deadline conditions

were subsequently less interested in the target activity
than
subjects in the control condition.

adult surveillance will

Lepper et

al

.

(1975) found that

inhibit (decrease duration of) children's

play.

Self reinforcement .

Bandura (1971) and Bandura and Perloff (1967)

note two components in the process of self-reinforcement:

selection of

a

standard of behavior and

administration of rewards.

2)

Work by Speidel

1)

self-

contingent self(1972) and Bandura and

Perloff (1967) as well as classroom studies by Lovitt and Curtiss
(1969) and Glynn (1970)
as well

indicates that self-reward maintains behavior

as experimenter-determined reinforcement (Weiner and

Dubanoski, 1975).

While self-administered reinforcement

has not

been more effective than externally administered contingencies
(Kanfer, Homme, and Csanyi,

1970; Gonzales and Rechs,

1969; Johnson,

1969), self-developed contingencies seem to be more effective than

imposed contingencies (Lovitt and Curtiss, 1969).

Weiner and Dubanoski (1975) cite

a

study by Kanfer and Duerfeldt

(1967) finding self-reinforced subjects making more correct discrim-

inations during extinction than experimenter-controlled subjects.
They cite Johnson (1970), Johnson and Martin (1971) and Bolstad
and Johnson (1972) as finding greater resistance to extinction

among sel f-reinforced subjects at discrimination tasks.

Weiner

and Dubanoski found that children permitted to select one of three

schedules of reinforcement for twenty contingently reinforced
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responses persisted longer and emitted more responses during

extinction than a group for whom schedule of reinforcement had been
selected by others.

Weiner and Dubanoski (1975) note that "recent research
regarding the acquisition of sel f-rei nforced responses

(Bern,

1967;

Hartig and Kanfer, 1973; Kanfer and Marston, 1963; Meichenbaum and
Goodman, 1971; Kanfer, 1970) has demonstrated that self-control

mechanisms can be established experimentally by means of learning
procedures similar to those used for establishment of external
stimulus control" (p. 905), and that modelling procedures play an

important part in the transmission of patterns of self-reinforce-

ment (Bandura and Kupers, 1964;

Hi

1

debrand t, Feldman and Ditrichs,

1973; McMains and Liebert, 1968; Mischel and Liebert, 1966).

Weiner and Dubanoski note that self-reinforcement can be transmitted
by training and modelling or both, and that consistency between

what is taught and what

is

standards of reinforcement.

modelled facilitates the adoption of
1

Lepper, Sagotsky, and Mailer (1975) found persistence of

effects (two weeks) after exposure to

a

model who reinforced him-

self at a game and generalization of those effects to

Lepper et

al

.

a

new game.

note:

The common assumption underlying a great deal of current
applied research on self-reinforcement and self-regulatory

Note that overjustification research indicates possible
deferred negative consequences when using reward procedures to
facilitate behavior.
1

,
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processes (Bolstad and Johnson, 1972; Drabman et al
1973; Glynn, Thomas and Shee, 1973; Mahoney and Thoreson,
1974) is that treatment programs which successfully
alter a person's self-imposed contingencies will be
more likely than programs which alter a person's
immediate environment to produce generalization of
treatment effects beyond the particular situation in
which the program was initially instituted.
.

Research investigating modelling and self-reinforcement,

procedures minimizing the amount of subject's perceived external
control, appears to have promise for changing behavior without

undesired attendant effects.

Attendant effects might include

fostering externality which has been associated with imposition of
control, poorer maintenance of behavior fostered, and undermining
of intrinsic interest in target or other behaviors.

Ramifications for the learning process

.

Ramifications of reward

procedures described in this paper seem greatest when studied in

relation to learning processes.

Negative effects of rewards have

been alleged by various writers, and for a variety of reasons.

Feingold and Mahoney (1975) state:

Given the increasing use of token economy procedures
in educational settings, continuing research into the
possiblity of "undermining" effects is timely and highly
The existence of such research indicates an
relevant.
ongoing evaluation and refinement of token economy
However, actual classroom practices have
procedures.
examination, and have benefited from
such
no
received
Given the concomitant
refinement.
analogous
no such
and educational factors,
social
de-emphasis of personal,
token procedures
classroom
it seems unlikely that all
(p. 376)
are free of negative effects,
Holt (1964) states, "we destroy ... the love of learning.
by.

.

..

in children

.compel! ing them to work for petty and contemptible rewards--
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gold stars, or papers marked 100 attached to the wall, or A's
on

report cards, or honor rolls, or dean's lists, or Phi Beta Kappa
keys" (p.

168).

Bruner (1965) states:

"learning that starts in

response to the rewards of parental or teacher approval or to
the avoidance of failure can too readily develop

a

pattern in which

the child is seeking cues as to how to conform to what is expected

of him" (p. 87).
a

Bruner notes:

"Much of the problem in leading

child to effective cognitive activity is to free him from the

immediate control of environmental rewards and punishments" (p.
87).

Deci

(1975) states:

Children are intrinsically motivated to learn (Neill,
Leonard); the activities of learning and discovery are
rewarding in their own right because they allow a child
to feel competent in relation to his environment.
The
use of rewards or punishments to encourage this learning
will only interfere with the learning, because it will
make the child's learning dependent on the reward and
cause him to do things that will lead him to the reward
in the easiest way.
This will undoubtedly leave him
having learned less.
(p. 212)

Winett and Winkler (1972), in an article assessing the effects
of behavior modification systems in the classroom, criticize our

educational system as one in which "there is

a

rigid preoccupation

with order and control and where children are required to be still,
to be silent, and to obey"

(p.

499).

Their review of behavior

modification literature indicates that too often behavior modification procedures seek to perpetuate the status quo and that the

inappropriate behavior which behavior modifiers seek to change
with
"has been consistently defined as behavior that interferes

order, quiet, and stillness" (p. 499).

This description of behaviors
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involves submission to control and, as such, is associated with
external ity.
The supposed end of education— devel opment of learning skills,
or cognitive capabi

1 i

ties—

i

s

operationally replaced with more

easily objectifiable factors loosely assumed to relate to those
gaols, such as attending behavior or sitting quietly.

Winett and

Winkler (1972) call for an assessment of educational goals, and,
in fact,

institutional goals, such as "goals for control for the

sake of control, order, and (misleading) tranquility" as opposed
to goals centered,

for example, on removal of patients from

psychiatric hospitals

(p.

O'Leary (1972) in an article

501).

critiquing Winett and Winkler, supports Winett and Winkler's call
for

a

division of means from ends in behavior modification programs,

and suggests that more attention be given long-term goals of, for

example, the educational process.
a

Davidson and Seidman (1974) in

review of articles relating to behavior modification programs

involving deliquents, state:
the helping professions have been guilty of guiding
clients toward conformity and blaming those who do
not respond to their efforts... a new technology will
merely be used to attain old ends more effectively,
(i.e. control) and a generally damaging juvenile
system will continue unaffected (Gold & Williams,
1969; Jones, 1969).
(p. 1009)

Thus we see that writers from varying backgrounds see control

supplanting learning as

a goal

in school

and treatment settings.

i
On the basis of research by Rotter and perceived locus-of-causal ty

writers one would expect an increase in individuals' belief in
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external control of their behavior.

By using rewards to foster

learning or control, we are decreasing amount of time spent learning

while fostering

a

belief in external control of our behavior.

Implications for the present research can be stated succinctly:
The use of reward procedures when applied, at least, to high base

rate behaviors has

a

deleterious effect on subsequent duration of

that similar behavior.
as' a

To the extent that learning is construed

high base-rate behavior and subject to the same principles as

other high base-rate behaviors, rewards can be expected to have
deleterious effect on the learning process.
research it appears that

a

a

On the basis of this

reaction against perception of attempts

at external control of one's behavior through reward procedures is

responsible for this decrement.

Summary .

This chapter reviews research related to the effects of

rewards on behavior, including its implications.

Writers on

education indicate that curiosity seems to diminish as
contact with the school system.

a

result of

Winett and Winkler (1972) studied

behavior modification procedures in schools and see them as being
used to control people for

used to foster learning.

the sake of control as opposed to being

Feingold and Mahoney (1975) alert us to

the possibility that discipline-relevant goals may interfere with

personal, social and educational considerations.
as well

as

Winett and Winkler

Feingold and Mahoney call for an assessment of goals in

the behavior modification literature.

Behavior modifiers and other writers have studied and found

a
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failure of learned behavior to generalize across
time and settings

without specific maintenance strategies.

These maintenance

strategies often involve verbal or attentional procedures
which
Levine and Fasnacht (1975) see as main treatments as opposed
to

maintenance strategies.

A lack of demonstrable maintenance effects

in token research would tend to support predictions

of generaliza-

tion of undermining effects.

Methodological problems with the behavior modification literature

prevent assessment as to whether potential usefulness of the
techniques outweighs negative consequences.
Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) review research and find that reward

procedures are not effective for some individuals.

suggest an individual difference variable.

These findings

Rotter reports that

individuals differ in their response to rewards on an internal ity-

externality continuum.

Weiner (1970) has linked internals with

persistence in the face of failure, resistance to extinction (Weiner
and Dubanoski, 1975), and has found they self-reinforce better than

externals.

In

experiments conducted for this paper, persistence

at a task was diminished through the use of tangible reward.

Rotter (1966) calls internals resistant to subtle attempts at
control, making them more susceptible to undermining effects, i.e.

more likely to react against perceived loss of control.

Extrinsic rewards, to the extent that they are perceived by
an individual

as being used to control

his behavior, will

cause

cognitive process to take place which Brehm (1972) has called

a
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psychological reactance.

An individual may perceive other factors

such as imposed deadlines and surveillance as well
as extrinsic

rewards as attempts to control his behavior.
the individual will

acquire

a

Through generalization,

constellation of behaviors which Rotter

measures as externality.
Once

a

constellation, either external or internal, has been

learned, it tends to be self-perpetuating.

It

is assumed

that

externality and internal ity are learned and can be unlearned, i.e.
increased or decreased.

For example, self-reinforcement can be

taught while rewards may undermine internal ity.

Research addressing

vicarious reinforcement and self-control processes was introduced
for its potential to avoid undermining effects.
internal ity-external ity merit investigation.
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